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Abstract
This paper investigates a hybrid stochastic differential reinsurance and investment game between one reinsurer
and two insurers, including a stochastic Stackelberg differential subgame and a non-zero-sum stochastic differential
subgame. The reinsurer, as the leader of the Stackelberg game, can price reinsurance premium and invest its wealth
in a financial market that contains a risk-free asset and a risky asset. The two insurers, as the followers of the
Stackelberg game, can purchase proportional reinsurance from the reinsurer and invest in the same financial market.
The competitive relationship between two insurers is modeled by the non-zero-sum game, and their decision making
will consider the relative performance measured by the difference in their terminal wealth. We consider wealth
processes with delay to characterize the bounded memory feature. This paper aims to find the equilibrium strategy
for the reinsurer and insurers by maximizing the expected utility of the reinsurer’s terminal wealth with delay and
maximizing the expected utility of the combination of insurers’ terminal wealth and the relative performance with
delay. By using the idea of backward induction and the dynamic programming approach, we derive the equilibrium
strategy and value functions explicitly. Then, we provide the corresponding verification theorem. Finally, some
numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are presented to demonstrate the effects of model parameters on the
equilibrium strategy. We find the delay factor discourages or stimulates investment depending on the length of delay.
Moreover, competitive factors between two insurers make their optimal reinsurance-investment strategy interact, and
reduce reinsurance demand and reinsurance premium price.
Keywords: Decision analysis; Stochastic differential games; Reinsurance contract design; Investment; Delay
1 Introduction
Insurers and reinsurers, as special financial institutions, not only have to face the investment risks in the financial market,
but also have to manage the risk of random claims in the insurance market. Insurers can sign reinsurance contracts
from the reinsurer and transfer part of the risk of claims to the reinsurer, because the reinsurer is more risk-seeking
than insurers. Research on optimal reinsurance and investment strategies has been an important part of mainstream
study in the actuarial field. In recent decades, many scholars have made extensive studies on reinsurance and investment
optimization problem under different objectives, for example, minimizing the probability of ruin (Browne (1995), Chen
et al. (2010), Li et al. (2015), etc.), maximizing the expected utility of the terminal wealth (Liang et al. (2011), Li
et al. (2012), Huang et al. (2016), Zhao and Rong (2017), etc.), maximizing the expected terminal surplus as well as
minimizing the variance of the terminal surplus ( Bi et al. (2014), Zhou et al. (2019a), Zhou et al. (2019b), etc.).
∗This research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 71771082, 71801091) and Hunan Provincial
Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 2017JJ1012).
†Corresponding author. E-mail: z.b.zhou@163.com; z.b.zhou@hnu.edu.cn.
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However, the majority of these researches study the reinsurance and investment optimization problem only from
the unilateral perspective of insurers, while the interest of the reinsurer is generally ignored. Since the setting of the
reinsurance contract depends on the mutual agreement between the insurer and the reinsurer, a reinsurance contract
that only considers the interest of one party may be unacceptable to the other party. That is, the reinsurance contract
should be designed to take into account the interests of both the insurer and the reinsurer. In view of the monopoly
position of the reinsurer and the competitive relationship between insurers in the market, we consider a reinsurer and
two insurers as the leader and the followers of a stochastic Stackelberg differential game respectively, and use the non-
zero-sum stochastic differential game to describe the competitive relationship. We investigate the reinsurer’s premium
pricing and investment optimization problem as well as insurers’ reinsurance and investment optimization problem.
That is, we consider the mutual interests of the reinsurer and two insurers as well as the competition between insurers.
As far as we know, the game problem in the insurance market has attracted some scholars’ attention. With re-
spect to maximizing the expected utility of the relative performance, Bensoussan et al. (2014) studied a non-zero-sum
stochastic differential investment and reinsurance game between two insurers whose surplus processes were modulated
by continuous-time Markov chains; Deng et al. (2018) investigated the implications of strategic interaction between two
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) insurers on their reinsurance-investment policies with default risk under the
framework of non-zero-sum stochastic differential game. There are still many studies on the non-zero-sum stochastic
differential reinsurance-investment game problem, such as Meng et al. (2015), Pun and Wong (2016), Guan and Liang
(2016), Yan et al. (2017), Zhu et al. (2018), etc.
Obviously, the above mentioned stochastic differential game models about reinsurance-investment problem do not
consider the interest of the reinsurer. Chen and Shen (2018) first proposed a stochastic Stackelberg differential reinsur-
ance game model to depict the leader-follower relationship between the reinsurer and insurer in the insurance market,
and analyzed optimal reinsurance strategy from joint interests of the insurer and the reinsurer. Chen and Shen (2019)
studied stochastic Stackelberg differential reinsurance games under time-inconsistent mean-variance framework. In-
spired by these insights, in this paper, we will build a more realistic stochastic differential reinsurance and investment
game model, i.e., the hybrid stochastic differential reinsurance and investment game model, which takes into account
the leader-follower relationship between the reinsurer and the insurers and the competitive relationship between the
insurers.
Traditionally, most of the researches on optimal reinsurance-investment decision making are based on current infor-
mation, ignoring the performance of past wealth. However, decisions often rely on the past information in real systems,
and delays arise naturally. This feature is commonly referred to as the delay feature or bounded memory feature (see
Chang et al. (2011) and Federico (2011)). Shen and Zeng (2014) first introduced the bounded memory feature of wealth
into the optimal investment-reinsurance problem for mean-variance insurers and obtained the optimal strategy under
certain conditions. Since then, A and Li (2015) considered an optimal investment and excess-of-loss reinsurance problem
with delay for an insurer under Heston’s stochastic volatility model. Yang et al. (2017) researched an optimal propor-
tional reinsurance problem for the compound Poisson risk model with delay under the mean-variance criterion. A et al.
(2018) studied an optimal investment and excess-of-loss reinsurance problem with delay and jump-diffusion risk process.
The delay feature of the wealth process has influence on decision making of the reinsurer and insurers. It would be more
practical to consider such a delay period. Therefore, this paper also considers the delay feature of the wealth processes
under the framework of the hybrid stochastic differential game.
The main work of this article is summarized as follows. We build a hybrid stochastic differential reinsurance and
investment game model, including stochastic Stackelberg differential subgame and non-zero-sum stochastic differential
subgame. One reinsurer and two insurers are three players in the hybrid game and are the leader and the followers in the
Stackelberg game respectively. The competitive relationship between two insurers is modeled by the non-zero-sum game,
and their decision making will consider the relative performance measured by the difference in their terminal wealth.
Furthermore, the effects of delay on wealth processes are considered. By using the idea of backward induction and the
dynamic programming approach, we derive the equilibrium strategy and value functions explicitly. Then, we establish the
corresponding verification theorem for the optimality of the given strategy. The equilibrium strategy indicates that the
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optimal reinsurance-investment strategies of two insurers interact with each other and reflect the herd effect. Moreover,
the optimal reinsurance strategies of insurers depend on the reinsurer’s optimal premium strategy. We study several
special cases of the model and find that the delay factor discourages or stimulates investment depending on the length
of the delay, and the optimal reinsurance premium in the intermediate case follows the principle of variance premium
when there is only one insurer and one reinsurer in the insurance market. Finally, we present some numerical examples
and sensitivity analysis to demonstrate the effects of the model parameters on the equilibrium strategy. Through the
analysis and numerical simulation of equilibrium strategy, we find that competitive factors between two insurers reduce
the demand for reinsurance and the price of reinsurance premium. In addition, we find that the effect of delay weight
on the equilibrium strategy is related to the length of delay.
Different from the existing literature, our work has the following four contributions. (1) We first construct a hybrid
stochastic differential reinsurance and investment game model including a stochastic Stackelberg differential subgame
and a non-zero-sum stochastic differential subgame. That is, we first consider the leader-follower relationship between
the reinsurer and insurers and the competitive relationship between insurers at the same time, which is closer to the
actual situation. (2) We consider the tripartite game between one reinsurer and two insurers, and the joint interests of
the reinsurer and insurers are considered, while the majority of the existing researches on non-zero-sum reinsurance and
investment game only focus on the insurer’s interest, ignoring the reinsurer’s interest generally. (3) Since reinsurance and
investment are important risk management tools, we study the stochastic differential reinsurance and investment game
problem, while Chen and Shen (2018) and Chen and Shen (2019) only studied the reinsurance optimization problem
under the framework of the Stackelberg game. (4) We consider the effect of the bounded memory feature of wealth
processes under the framework of the hybrid stochastic differential game, which has rarely been studied in the past.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the hybrid stochastic differential reinsurance
and investment game between one reinsurer and two insurers with delay. In Section 3, we derive the equilibrium strategy
and value functions for the hybrid game problem by using the idea of backward induction and the dynamic programming
approach. Then, we establish a verification theorem for the optimality of the equilibrium strategy and study some special
cases of our model. Section 4 provides some numerical examples and sensitivity analysis to demonstrate the effects of
the model parameters on the equilibrium strategy. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model setup
In this section, we describe the model in details. Let [0, T ] be a continuous-time finite horizon, over which reinsurance
and investment behavior can occur. The uncertainty in markets is represented by a complete probability space (Ω,F , P ),
which is equipped with a filtration F = {Ft}0≤t≤T satisfying the usual conditions.
2.1 Dynamics of the surplus processes
We consider an insurance market containing two competing insurers and one reinsurer. The surplus process of insurer
i ∈ {1, 2}, denoted by {Xi(t)}t≥0, is depicted by the classic Crame´r-Lundberg risk model:
Xi(t) = x
0
i + cit−
Ni(t)+N(t)∑
n=1
Y˜ ni , i ∈ {1, 2}, (2.1)
where x0i > 0 and ci ≥ 0 are the initial surplus and the premium rate of insurer i, respectively; Ni(t) +N(t) represents
the number of claims up to time t; {Y˜ ni ≥ 0, n ≥ 1} is a list of independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
variables with distribution function Fi(Y˜ ); Y˜
n
i represents the amount of the n-th claim of insurer i. We assume that
(i) {Y˜ ni ≥ 0, n ≥ 1} has finite first moment µi (0 < µi < +∞) and finite secondary moment (σ˜i)2 < +∞;
(ii) {Y˜ ni ≥ 0, n ≥ 1} is independent of Ni(t) and N(t);
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(iii) N1(t), N2(t) and N(t) are three mutually independent Poisson processes with intensity λ˜1 > 0, λ˜2 > 0 and λ˜ > 0,
respectively.
Then, the surplus process {Xi(t)}t≥0 indicates that insurer 1 and insurer 2 are subject to common impact that is
represented by {N(t)}t≥0. Refer to Grandell (1977), Browne (1995), Gerber and Shiu (2006), Bai and Guo (2008), Chen
et al. (2018) etc., the classic Crame´r-Lundberg model (2.1) can be approximated by the following diffusion process:
dXi(t) = cidt− λiµidt+
√
λi(σ˜i)2dWi(t), Xi(0) = x
0
i , i ∈ {1, 2}, (2.2)
where λi = λ˜i + λ˜; {Wi(t), t ≥ 0} is a standard F-Brownian motion. d〈W1(t),W2(t)〉 = ρdt, where ρ = λ˜µ1µ2√λ1λ2σ˜1σ˜2 .
According to expected value premium principle, we know that ci = (1 + θi)λiµi, where θi > 0 is the safety loading of
insurer i. Both two insurers can manage its claim risk through purchasing proportional reinsurance continuously from
the reinsurer. The reinsurance strategy of insurer i is characterized by {qi(t), t ≥ 0} satisfying qi(t) ∈ [0, 1]. Then the
reinsurer will cover (1− qi(t))100% of the claims of insurer i while insurer i will cover remaining at time t. The price of
the reinsurance premium at time t is p(t) ∈ [cF , c¯], where cF = max{c1, c2}, c¯ = (1+ θ¯)λFµF , θ¯ is an upper bound of the
reinsurer’s relative safety loading, θ¯ > max{θ1, θ2} and λFµF = max{λ1µ1, λ2µ2}. Introducing proportional reinsurance
strategy qi(t) into equation (2.2), then
dXi(t) = [θiai − (p(t)− ai)(1− qi(t))]dt+ qi(t)σidWi(t), i ∈ {1, 2}, (2.3)
where ai = λiµi, σi =
√
λi(σ˜i)2. The surplus process of the reinsurer is as following:
dXL(t) =[(p(t)− a1)(1− q1(t)) + (p(t)− a2)(1− q2(t))]dt
+ (1− q1(t))σ1dW1(t) + (1− q2(t))σ2dW2(t), XL(0) = x0L. (2.4)
2.2 Dynamics of the financial assets
Assuming that both the reinsurer and two insurers can invest in a financial market that contains one risk-free asset
and one risky asset. The price process of the risk-free asset, {S0(t)}t≥0, is given by the following ordinary differential
equation (ODE):
dS0(t) = r0S0(t)dt, S0(0) = 1, (2.5)
where r0 is the constant risk-free interest rate. The price process of the risky asset, {S(t)}t≥0, is described by the
constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model:
dS(t) = S(t)
[
rdt+ σSβ(t)dW (t)
]
, S(0) = s0, (2.6)
where r, σSβ(t) and β denote the expected return rate, the volatility and the constant elasticity parameter of the
risky asset, respectively; r > r0 > 0, σ > 0; {W (t), t ≥ 0} is a standard F-Brownian motion and is independent of
{W1(t), t ≥ 0} and {W2(t), t ≥ 0}. The CEV model can reduce to a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) when β = 0.
If β < 0, the volatility σSβ(t) increases as the stock price decreases, and a distribution with a fatter left tail can be
generated. If β > 0, the volatility σSβ(t) increases as the stock price increases.
2.3 Wealth processes with delay
Suppose that there are no transaction costs or taxes for investment and reinsurance, and short-selling of the risky asset
is allowed. Let {bL(t), t ≥ 0}, {b1(t), t ≥ 0} and {b2(t), t ≥ 0} be measurable processes valued in R representing the
amount invested in the risky asset by the reinsurer, insurer 1 and insurer 2 at time t, respectively. Then, the remaining
wealth XL(t) − bL(t), X1(t) − b1(t) and X2(t) − b2(t) are invested in the risk-free asset. Let piL(t) = (p(t), bL(t)),
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pi1(t) = (q1(t), b1(t)) and pi2(t) = (q2(t), b2(t)). Then, with strategy {piL(t), t ≥ 0}, the wealth process of the reinsurer,
denoted by {XpiLL (t)}t≥0, can be expressed as:
dXpiLL (t) =[(p(t)− a1)(1− q1(t)) + (p(t)− a2)(1− q2(t)) + r0XpiLL (t) + (r − r0)bL(t)]dt
+ (1− q1(t))σ1dW1(t) + (1− q2(t))σ2dW2(t) + bL(t)σSβ(t)dW (t). (2.7)
With strategy {pii(t), t ≥ 0}, the wealth process of insurer i, denoted by {Xpiii (t)}t≥0, can be expressed as:
dXpiii (t) =[θiai − (p(t)− ai)(1− qi(t)) + r0Xpiii (t) + (r − r0)bi(t)]dt
+ qi(t)σidWi(t) + bi(t)σS
β(t)dW (t), i ∈ {1, 2}. (2.8)
In fact, due to the bounded memory feature, the reinsurer’s and insurers’ strategies depend on the exogenous
capital instantaneous inflow into or outflow from current wealth. Refer to A and Li (2015), let YL(t) and ZL(t) be the
integrated and pointwise delayed information of the reinsurer’s wealth process in the past horizon [t−hL, t], respectively.
Correspondingly, let Yi(t) and Zi(t) be the integrated and pointwise delayed information of insurer i’s wealth process
in the past horizon [t− hi, t], respectively. That is, for ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
YL(t) =
∫ 0
−hL
eαLsXpiLL (t+ s)ds, ZL(t) = X
piL
L (t− hL), (2.9)
Yi(t) =
∫ 0
−hi
eαisXpiii (t+ s)ds, Zi(t) = X
pii
i (t− hi), i ∈ {1, 2}, (2.10)
where αL > 0 and αi > 0 are the average parameters; hL > 0 and hi > 0 are the delay time parameters. Let
fL(t,XL(t) − YL(t), XL(t) − ZL(t)) and fi(t,Xi(t) − Yi(t), Xi(t) − Zi(t)) represent the capital inflow/outflow amount
of the reinsurer and insurer i, respectively; where XL(t) − YL(t), Xi(t) − Yi(t) represent the average performance and
XL(t) − ZL(t), Xi(t) − Zi(t) represent the absolute performance. Such capital inflow/outflow, which is related to the
past performance of the wealth, may come out in various situations. For example, a good past performance may bring
the company more gain and further the company can pay a part of the gain as dividend to its shareholders. Contrarily,
a poor past performance forces the company to seek further capital injection for covering the loss so that the final
performance objective is still achievable. To make the problem solvable, we assume
fL(t,XL(t)− YL(t), XL(t)− ZL(t)) = BL(XL(t)− YL(t)) + CL(XL(t)− ZL(t)), (2.11)
fi(t,Xi(t)− Yi(t), Xi(t)− Zi(t)) = Bi(Xi(t)− Yi(t)) + Ci(Xi(t)− Zi(t)), i ∈ {1, 2}, (2.12)
where BL, CL, Bi and Ci are nonnegative constants. In other words, the amount of the capital inflow/outflow is the
linear weighted sum of the average performance and the absolute performance. Then, considering capital inflow/outflow
functions fL(t,XL(t)−YL(t), XL(t)−ZL(t)) and fi(t,Xi(t)−Yi(t), Xi(t)−Zi(t)), the wealth processes of the reinsurer
and insurer i are governed by the following stochastic differential delay equations (SDDEs), respectively:
dXpiLL (t) =
[
(p(t)− a1)(1− q1(t)) + (p(t)− a2)(1− q2(t)) +ALXpiLL (t) + (r − r0)bL(t) +BLYL(t) + CLZL(t)
]
dt
+ (1− q1(t))σ1dW1(t) + (1− q2(t))σ2dW2(t) + bL(t)σSβ(t)dW (t), (2.13)
dXpiii (t) =
[
θiai − (p(t)− ai)(1− qi(t)) +AiXpiii (t) +BiYi(t) + CiZi(t) + (r − r0)bi(t)
]
dt
+ qi(t)σidWi(t) + bi(t)σS
β(t)dW (t), i ∈ {1, 2}, (2.14)
where AL = r0−BL−CL, Ai = r0−Bi−Ci. In addition, we assume that insurer i, i ∈ {1, 2}, is endowed with the initial
wealth x0i at time −hi and does not start the business (insurance/reinsurance/investment) until time 0, i.e., Xi(t) =
x0i > 0,∀t ∈ [−hi, 0]. Correspondingly, suppose that XL(t) = x0L > 0,∀t ∈ [−hL, 0]. Then, YL(0) = x
0
L
αL
(1− e−αLhL) and
Yi(0) =
x0i
αi
(1− e−αihi). For any fixed t ∈ [0, T ], denote XpiLL (t) = xL, YL(t) = yL, ZL(t) = zL, Xpiii (t) = xi, Yi(t) = yi,
Zi(t) = zi and S(t) = s. Then, we define the admissible strategy as follows.
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Definition 1 (Admissible strategy) pi(·) = piL(·)× pi1(·)× pi2(·) = (p(·), bL(·))× (q1(·), b1(·))× (q2(·), b2(·)) is said to be
admissible, if
(i) {piL(t)}t∈[0,T ], {pi1(t)}t∈[0,T ] and {pi2(t)}t∈[0,T ] are F-progressively measurable processes, such that p(t) ∈ [cF , c¯],
q1(t) ∈ [0, 1] and q2(t) ∈ [0, 1] for any t ∈ [0, T ];
(ii) E
[∫ T
t
[(bL(`))
2 + (p(`))2]d`
]
< +∞ and E
[∫ T
t
[(bi(`))
2 + (qi(`))
2]d`
]
< +∞, ∀` ∈ [t, T ], i ∈ {1, 2};
(iii) the equation (2.13) associated with pi(·) has a unique solution XpiLL (·), which satisfies {Et,xL,yL,s
[
sup |XpiLL (`)|2
]} 12
< +∞, for ∀(t, xL, yL, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R× R, ∀` ∈ [t, T ];
(iv) the equation (2.14) associated with pi(·) has a unique solution Xpiii (·), which satisfies {Et,xi,yi,s
[
sup |Xpiii (`)|2
]} 12
< +∞, for ∀(t, xi, yi, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R× R, ∀` ∈ [t, T ], i ∈ {1, 2}.
Let Π = ΠL ×Π1 ×Π2 be the set of all admissible strategies, where ΠL, Π1 and Π2 denote the set of all admissible
strategies of the reinsurer, insurer 1 and insurer 2, respectively.
2.4 The hybrid game problem
In view of the monopoly position of the reinsurer and the competitive relationship between insurers in the market,
we investigate a hybrid stochastic differential reinsurance and investment game with delay. The reinsurer and the two
insurers are three players in the hybrid game. The game between the reinsurer and two insurers is a stochastic Stackelberg
differential game, in which the reinsurer is the leader and two insurers are the followers. The game between the two
insurers is a non-zero-sum stochastic differential game, and their status is equal. More intuitively, the relationships
between these three companies are shown in Figure 1. ∗
Figure 1: Relationships between three companies.
The goal of the hybrid game is to seek the equilibrium by solving the optimization problems of three parties. Refer
to Chen and Shen (2018), Chen and Shen (2019) and Asmussen et al. (2019), the procedure of solving the Stackelberg
game is to solve the leader’s and followers’ optimization problems sequentially, based on the idea of backward induction.
To be more specific, the procedure can be divided into the following three steps:
∗The non-zero-sum game between two insurers can also be regarded as the subgame of the Stackelberg game.
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• Step 1: The leader (i.e., the reinsurer) moves first by announcing its any admissible strategy (p(·), bL(·)) ∈ ΠL;
• Step 2: The followers (i.e., the two insurers) observe the reinsurer’s strategy and obtain their optimal strategies
q∗1(·) = α∗1(·, p(·), bL(·)), b∗1(·) = β∗1(·, p(·), bL(·)), q∗2(·) = α∗2(·, p(·), bL(·)), b∗2(·) = β∗2(·, p(·), bL(·)) by solving their
optimization problems;
• Step 3: Knowing that the two insurers would execute α∗1(·, p(·), bL(·)), β∗1(·, p(·), bL(·)), α∗2(·, p(·), bL(·)) and
β∗2(·, p(·), bL(·)), the reinsurer then decides on its optimal strategy (p∗(·), b∗L(·)) by solving its own optimization
problem.
Due to the reinsurer’s bounded memory feature, we suppose that the reinsurer is concerned about not only the
terminal wealth XpiLL (T ), but also the integrated delayed information over the period [T − hL, T ], i.e., YL(T ). In other
words, the objective of the reinsurer is to find the premium strategy and investment strategy to maximize the expected
utility of XpiLL (T ) + ηLYL(T ), where the constant ηL ∈ (0, 1) represents the sensitivity of the reinsurer to past wealth.
Due to the fierce competition in the insurance market, insurer i (i ∈ {1, 2}) should consider not only the bounded
memory feature of its own wealth, but also the wealth gap between itself and insurer j (j 6= i ∈ {1, 2}) at the terminal
time T . In other words, the objective of insurer i is to find the optimal reinsurance strategy and investment strategy
such that the expected utility of the combination of its terminal wealth and the relative performance with delay is
maximized. That is, insurer i will choose a reinsurance-investment strategy pii(·) = (qi(·), bi(·)) ∈ Πi such that
E
[
Ui
(
(1− ki)(Xpiii (T ) + ηiYi(T )) + ki((Xpiii (T ) + ηiYi(T ))− (Xpijj (T ) + ηjYj(T )))
)]
=E
[
Ui
(
(Xpiii (T ) + ηiYi(T ))− ki(Xpijj (T ) + ηjYj(T ))
)]
, i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, (2.15)
is maximized. Here, Ui (i ∈ {1, 2}) is the utility function of insurer i, ηi ∈ (0, 1) values the weight of Yi(T ), ki ∈ [0, 1]
measures the sensitivity of insurer i to the performance of insurer j (j 6= i ∈ {1, 2}).
Refer to Bensoussan et al. (2014), Yan et al. (2017) and Deng et al. (2018), the non-zero-sum game problem is to find
an equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) ∈ Π1 × Π2 such that for any (pi1, pi2) ∈ Π1 × Π2, the following
inequations are simultaneously established.
E
[
U1
(
(Xpi11 (T ) + η1Y1(T ))− k1(Xpi
∗
2
2 (T ) + η2Y2(T ))
)] ≤ E [U1((Xpi∗11 (T ) + η1Y1(T ))− k1(Xpi∗22 (T ) + η2Y2(T )))] ,
(2.16)
E
[
U2
(
(Xpi22 (T ) + η2Y2(T ))− k2(Xpi
∗
1
1 (T ) + η1Y1(T ))
)] ≤ E [U2((Xpi∗22 (T ) + η2Y2(T ))− k2(Xpi∗11 (T ) + η1Y1(T )))] .
(2.17)
The way of solving the non-zero-sum game is to solve the optimization problems of both two insurers at the same time.
That is, in Step 2, we have to solve the optimization problems for both two insurers simultaneously. For convenience,
we denote Xˆpiii (t) = X
pii
i (t)− kiXpijj (t), for i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}. Then, from (2.14), we have
dXˆpiii (t) =
[
θiai − kiθjaj − (p(t)− ai)(1− qi(t)) + ki(p(t)− aj)(1− qj(t)) +AiXpiii (t)− kiAjXpijj (t) +BiYi(t)
− kiBjYj(t) + CiZi(t)− kiCjZj(t) + (r − r0)(bi(t)− kibj(t))
]
dt+ qi(t)σidWi(t)− kiqj(t)σjdWj(t)
+ (bi(t)− kibj(t))σSβ(t)dW (t), i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, (2.18)
with Xˆpiii (0) = X
pii
i (0) − kiXpijj (0) = x0i − kix0j .= xˆ0i . For any fixed t ∈ [0, T ], let Xˆpiii (t) = Xpiii (t) − kiXpijj (t) =
xi − kixj .= xˆi.
Then, the hybrid stochastic differential reinsurance and investment game problem can be described as the following
problem.
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Problem The problem of insurer i (i ∈ {1, 2}) is the following optimization problem: for any piL(·) = (p(·), bL(·)) ∈ ΠL,
find a map (q∗i (·), b∗i (·)) = (α∗i (·, p(·), bL(·)), β∗i (·, p(·), bL(·))) : [0, T ]×Ω×ΠL → Πi such that the following value function
holds.
V Fi(t, xˆi, yi, yj , s; p(·), bL(·), α∗i (·, p(·), bL(·)), β∗i (·, p(·), bL(·)))
= sup
(qi(·),bi(·))∈Πi
V Fi(t, xˆi, yi, yj , s; p(·), bL(·), qi(·), bi(·))
= sup
(qi(·),bi(·))∈Πi
Et,xˆi,yi,yj ,s
[
Ui
(
Xpiii (T ) + ηiYi(T )− ki(X
pi∗j
j (T ) + ηjYj(T ))
)]
, i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}. (2.19)
The reinsurer’s problem is the following optimization problem: find the optimal strategy (p∗(·), b∗L(·)) ∈ ΠL such that
the following value function holds.
V L
(
t, xL, yL, s; p
∗(·), b∗L(·), α∗1(·, p∗(·), b∗L(·)), β∗1(·, p∗(·), b∗L(·)), α∗2(·, p∗(·), b∗L(·)), β∗2(·, p∗(·), b∗L(·))
)
= sup
(p(·),bL(·))∈ΠL
V L
(
t, xL, yL, s; p(·), bL(·), α∗1(·, p(·), bL(·)), β∗1(·, p(·), bL(·)), α∗2(·, p(·), bL(·)), β∗2(·, p(·), bL(·))
)
= sup
(p(·),bL(·))∈ΠL
Et,xL,yL,s [UL(X
piL
L (T ) + ηLYL(T ))] , (2.20)
where UL is the utility function of the reinsurer.
Definition 2 The pair
(
p∗(·), b∗L(·), α∗1(·, p∗(·), b∗L(·)), β∗1(·, p∗(·), b∗L(·)), α∗2(·, p∗(·), b∗L(·)), β∗2(·, p∗(·), b∗L(·))
)
is called an
equilibrium strategy of the hybrid game.
Furthermore, if there is no risk of confusion, when the equilibrium strategy of the hybrid game is adopted, V Fi(t, xˆi, yi,
yj , s; p
∗(·), b∗L(·), α∗i (·, p∗(·), b∗L(·)), β∗i (·, p∗(·), b∗L(·))) is also called the value function of the insurer i.
3 Solution to the hybrid game for CARA preference
Assume that both the reinsurer and insurers are constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) agents, i.e., the reinsurer and
insurer i (i ∈ {1, 2}) have exponential utility functions:
UL(xL + ηLyL) = − 1
γL
exp(−γL(xL + ηLyL)), (3.21)
Ui(xˆi + ηiyi − kiηjyj) = − 1
γi
exp(−γi(xˆi + ηiyi − kiηjyj)), i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, (3.22)
where γL > 0 and γi > 0 are the constant absolute risk aversion coefficients of the reinsurer and insurer i, respectively.
According to existing literatures, the optimal control problem with delay is infinite-dimensional in general. To make the
problem solvable and finite-dimensional, we assume the following conditions on parameters CL = ηLe
−αLhL , BLe−αLhL =
(αL +AL + ηL)CL, Ci = ηie
−αihi , Bie−αihi = (αi +Ai + ηi)Ci, i ∈ {1, 2}.
3.1 Equilibrium strategy and value functions
By using the idea of backward induction mentioned in Section 2.4 and dynamic programming techniques, we solve the
hybrid game problem and obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Suppose that A1 + η1 = A2 + η2, k1k2 < 1 and k1k2ρ
2 < 1. The equilibrium strategy of the Stackelberg
game problem is (p∗(t), b∗L(t), q
∗
1(t), b
∗
1(t), q
∗
2(t), b
∗
2(t)), where b
∗
L(t), b
∗
1(t) and b
∗
2(t) are given by
b∗L(t) =
s−2β
γLϕL(t)
[ (r − r0)
σ2
− 2βg1(t)
]
, (3.23)
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b∗1(t) =
s−2β
(1− k1k2)ϕF1(t)
( 1
γ1
+
k1
γ2
)[r − r0
σ2
− 2βg1(t)
]
, (3.24)
b∗2(t) =
s−2β
(1− k1k2)ϕF2(t)
( 1
γ2
+
k2
γ1
)[r − r0
σ2
− 2βg1(t)
]
; (3.25)
p∗(t), q∗1(t) and q
∗
2(t) under different cases are given by the following:
Case (1): If N cF1(t) + k1ρσ2σ1 ≥ 1, N cF2(t) +
k2ρσ1
σ2
≥ 1, then p∗(t) = p, q∗1(t) = 1, q∗2(t) = 1, where ∀p ∈ [cF , c¯];
Case (2): If K[N c¯F1(t) + k1ρσ2σ1 N
c¯F2(t)] ≥ 1, N c¯F2(t) ≤ (1− k2ρσ1σ2 )MF2(t), then p∗(t) = c¯, q∗1(t) = 1, q∗2(t) = N c¯F2(t) +
k2ρσ1
σ2
;
Case (3): If K[N cF1(t) + k1ρσ2σ1 N
cF2(t)] ≥ 1, (1 − k2ρσ1σ2 )MF2(t) ≤ N cF2(t) < 1 −
k2ρσ1
σ2
, then p∗(t) = cF , q∗1(t) = 1,
q∗2(t) = N
cF2(t) + k2ρσ1σ2 ;
Case (4): If K[NaF1(t) + KF˜1MF2(t)] ≥ 1, N cF2(t) < (1 − k2ρσ1σ2 )MF2(t) < min{N c¯F2(t), 1 −
k2ρσ1
σ2
}, then p∗(t) =
a2 + γ2σ
2
2ϕ
F2(t)(1− k2ρσ1σ2 )MF2(t), q∗1(t) = 1, q∗2(t) = (1−
k2ρσ1
σ2
)MF2(t) + k2ρσ1σ2 ;
Case (5): If K[N c¯F2(t) + k2ρσ1σ2 N
c¯F1(t)] ≥ 1, N c¯F1(t) ≤ (1 − k1ρσ2σ1 )MF1(t), then p∗(t) = c¯, q∗1(t) = N c¯F1(t) +
k1ρσ2
σ1
,
q∗2(t) = 1;
Case (6): If K[N cF2(t) + k2ρσ1σ2 N
cF1(t)] ≥ 1, (1 − k1ρσ2σ1 )MF1(t) ≤ N cF1(t) < 1 −
k1ρσ2
σ1
, then p∗(t) = cF , q∗1(t) =
N cF1(t) + k1ρσ2σ1 , q
∗
2(t) = 1;
Case (7): If K[NaF2(t) + KF˜2MF1(t)] ≥ 1, N cF1(t) < (1 − k1ρσ2σ1 )MF1(t) < min{N c¯F1(t), 1 −
k1ρσ2
σ1
}, then p∗(t) =
a1 + γ1σ
2
1ϕ
F1(t)(1− k1ρσ2σ1 )MF1(t), q∗1(t) = (1−
k1ρσ2
σ1
)MF1(t) + k1ρσ2σ1 , q
∗
2(t) = 1;
Case (8): If K[N c¯F1(t) + k1ρσ2σ1 N
c¯F2(t)] < 1, K[N c¯F2(t) + k2ρσ1σ2 N
c¯F1(t)] < 1, P
N (t)
PD(t)
≥ c¯, then p∗(t) = c¯, q∗1(t) =
K[N c¯F1(t) + k1ρσ2σ1 N
c¯F2(t)], q∗2(t) = K[N
c¯F2(t) + k2ρσ1σ2 N
c¯F1(t)];
Case (9): If K[N cF1(t) + k1ρσ2σ1 N
cF2(t)] < 1, K[N cF2(t) + k2ρσ1σ2 N
cF1(t)] < 1, P
N (t)
PD(t)
≤ cF , then p∗(t) = cF , q∗1(t) =
K[N cF1(t) + k1ρσ2σ1 N
cF2(t)], q∗2(t) = K[N
cF2(t) + k2ρσ1σ2 N
cF1(t)];
Case (10): If K[
PN (t)
PD(t)
−a1
γ1σ21ϕ
F1 (t)
+
k1ρ(
PN (t)
PD(t)
−a2)
γ2σ2σ1ϕF2 (t)
] < 1, K[
PN (t)
PD(t)
−a2
γ2σ22ϕ
F2 (t)
+
k2ρ(
PN (t)
PD(t)
−a1)
γ1σ1σ2ϕF1 (t)
] < 1, cF <
PN (t)
PD(t)
< c¯, then p∗(t) = P
N (t)
PD(t)
,
q∗1(t) = K[
PN (t)
PD(t)
−a1
γ1σ21ϕ
F1 (t)
+
k1ρ(
PN (t)
PD(t)
−a2)
γ2σ2σ1ϕF2 (t)
], q∗2(t) = K[
PN (t)
PD(t)
−a2
γ2σ22ϕ
F2 (t)
+
k2ρ(
PN (t)
PD(t)
−a1)
γ1σ1σ2ϕF1 (t)
].
where ϕL(t), ϕFi(t) and g1(t) are given by (A.67), (A.51) and (A.54), respectively; K, K
F˜i , KFi , N cFi(t), N c¯Fi(t),
NaFi(t) and MFi(t) are given by (A.70); PN (t) and PD(t) are given by (A.91) and (A.92), respectively.
The value function of the reinsurer is given by
V L(t, xL, yL, s) = − 1
γL
exp{−γLϕL(t)(xL + ηLyL) + g1(t)s−2β + gL2 (t)}, (3.26)
and, the value function of insurer 1 is given by
V F1(t, xˆ1, y1, y2, s) =− 1
γ1
exp{−γ1ϕF1(t)(xˆ1 + η1y1 − k1η2y2) + g1(t)s−2β + gF12 (t)}, (3.27)
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and, the value function of insurer 2 is given by
V F2(t, xˆ2, y2, y1, s) =− 1
γ2
exp{−γ2ϕF2(t)(xˆ2 + η2y2 − k2η1y1) + g1(t)s−2β + gF22 (t)}, (3.28)
where gL2 (t), g
F1
2 (t) and g
F2
2 (t) under different cases are given by Table 1; g
La
2 (t) is given by equation (A.73); for
Table 1: gL2 (t), g
F1
2 (t) and g
F2
2 (t) under different cases.
Cases gL2 (t) g
F1
2 (t) g
F2
2 (t)
Case(1) gLa2 (t) g
F1a
2 (t) g
F2a
2 (t)
Case(2) gL2b12 (t) g
F1b1
2 (t) g
F˜2b1
2 (t)
Case(3) gL2b22 (t) g
F1b2
2 (t) g
F˜2b2
2 (t)
Case(4) gL2b32 (t) g
F1b3
2 (t) g
F˜2b3
2 (t)
Case(5) gL1b12 (t) g
F˜1b1
2 (t) g
F2b1
2 (t)
Case(6) gL1b22 (t) g
F˜1b2
2 (t) g
F2b2
2 (t)
Case(7) gL1b32 (t) g
F˜1b3
2 (t) g
F2b3
2 (t)
Case(8) gLc12 (t) g
F1c1
2 (t) g
F2c1
2 (t)
Case(9) gLc22 (t) g
F1c2
2 (t) g
F2c2
2 (t)
Case(10) gLc32 (t) g
F1c3
2 (t) g
F2c3
2 (t)
j ∈ {1, 2}, gLjb12 (t), gLjb22 (t) and gLjb32 (t) are given by equations (A.77), (A.81) and (A.85), respectively; gLc12 (t), gLc22 (t)
and gLc32 (t) are given by equations (A.94), (A.97) and (A.100), respectively; g
Fia
2 (t) is given by equation (A.59); for
i ∈ {1, 2}, gFib12 (t), gFib22 (t) and gFib32 (t) are given by equations (A.78), (A.82) and (A.86),respectively; gF˜jb12 (t), gF˜jb22 (t)
and g
F˜jb3
2 (t) are given by equations (A.79), (A.83) and (A.87), respectively; g
Fic1
2 (t), g
Fic2
2 (t) and g
Fic3
2 (t) are given by
equations (A.95), (A.98) and (A.101),respectively.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 1 Case (1) in Theorem 1 corresponds to Case (La) of Appendix A. In this situation, both two insurers do not
sign the reinsurance contract and bear all claims themselves. Case (2), Case (3) and Case (4) in Theorem 1 correspond
to the case of i = 1, j = 2 in Case (Lb) of Appendix A. This situation can be understood as that insurer 1 bears all the
claim risk by itself, and insurer 2 adopts the reinsurance strategy to spread its claim risk. Case (5), Case (6) and Case
(7) in Theorem 1 correspond to the case of i = 2, j = 1 in Case (Lb) of Appendix A. That is, insurer 2 bears all the
claim risk by itself, and insurer 1 adopts the reinsurance strategy to spread its claim risk. Case (8), Case (9) and Case
(10) in Theorem 1 correspond to the Case (Lc) of Appendix A. In this case, both two insurers will sign the reinsurance
contract to spread their claims risk.
Remark 2 More generally, if there’s one reinsurer and n insurers in the insurance market, the optimal premium strategy
and the optimal reinsurance strategies will have C0n + 3(C
1
n + C
2
n + · · ·+ Cnn ) = 1 + 3(2n − 1) situations.
Corollary 1 The insurer i’s (i ∈ {1, 2}) optimal reinsurance strategy can be expressed by the optimal premium price
strategy and the insurer j’s (j 6= i ∈ {1, 2}) optimal reinsurance strategy. That is,
q∗i (t) =
[ p∗(t)− ai
γiσ2i ϕ
Fi(t)
+
kiρσjq
∗
j (t)
σi
]
∧ 1, i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}. (3.29)
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The optimal investment strategy of insurer i’s (i ∈ {1, 2}) can be expressed by the optimal reinsurance strategy of
insurer j’s (j 6= i ∈ {1, 2}). That is
b∗i (t) = kib
∗
j (t) +
1
γiϕFi(t)s2β
[r − r0
σ2
− 2βg1(t)
]
, i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}. (3.30)
Moreover, we have
∂q∗i (t)
∂p∗(t)
> 0,
∂q∗i (t)
∂q∗j (t)
> 0,
∂b∗i (t)
∂b∗j (t)
> 0, i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}. (3.31)
Proof: (3.29),(3.30) and (3.31) are obviously established, and we omit the proof here.
Through Corollary 1, we find that the equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategies of the two insurers interact with
each other and exhibit herd effect. That is insurer i’s (i ∈ {1, 2}) will imitate insurer j’s (j 6= i ∈ {1, 2}) reinsurance-
investment strategy. More specifically, the amount of insurer i invested in the risky asset will increase with the amount
that insurer j invested in the risky asset; the reserve proportion of insurer i will also increase with the increase of
the reserve proportion of insurer j. Furthermore, the optimal reinsurance strategies of insurers depend on the optimal
premium strategy. The reserve proportion of insurers will increase with the increase of reinsurance premium price,
that is, a high reinsurance premium price will reduce the reinsurance demand. These findings illustrate considering
leader-follower relationship and competitive relationship at the same time will make decisions more rational and more
realistic.
Similar to Lin and Qian (2015), we find that the reinsurer’s investment strategy b∗L(t) in Theorem 1 contains two
parts. The first part 1
γLϕL(t)s2β
(r−r0)
σ2 has an updated instantaneous volatility at the current time t, while the second
part −2β
γLϕL(t)s2β
g1(t) results from the fact that the reinsurer tries to hedge its portfolio against the additional volatility
risk. When β > 0, we have e−2r0β(T−t) < 1 and −2β
γLϕL(t)s2β
g1(t) > 0, it will cause positive deviation from the classical
result (i.e., the investment strategy when the price of the risky asset obeys GBM model †). Conversely, when β < 0, we
have e−2r0β(T−t) > 1 and −2β
γLϕL(t)s2β
g1(t) < 0, it will cause negative deviation from the classical result. Correspondingly,
the investment strategies of two insurers have similar analysis.
Corollary 2 If β ≥ 0, some properties of b∗L(t) and b∗i (t) (i = 1, 2) are given in Table 2, (3.32) and (3.33).
Table 2: The properties of b∗L(t) and b
∗
i (t).
∂b∗L(t)
∂γL
∂b∗L(t)
∂hL
∂b∗i (t)
∂γi
∂b∗i (t)
∂ki
∂b∗i (t)
∂hi
− − − + −
∂b∗L(t)
∂αL
=

> 0, αL > − 1hL ln
1
hL
;
= 0, αL = − 1hL ln
1
hL
;
< 0, αL < − 1hL ln
1
hL
.
∂b∗i (t)
∂αi
=

> 0, αi > − 1hi ln
1
hi
;
= 0, αi = − 1hi ln
1
hi
;
< 0, αi < − 1hi ln
1
hi
.
(3.32)
Furthermore, if r0 + αL < 1 and r0 + αi < 1, i = 1, 2, then
∂b∗L(t)
∂ηL
=

> 0, hL < − 1αL ln(1− r0 − αL);
= 0, hL = − 1αL ln(1− r0 − αL);
< 0, hL > − 1αL ln(1− r0 − αL).
∂b∗i (t)
∂ηi
=

> 0, hi < − 1αi ln(1− r0 − αi);
= 0, hi = − 1αi ln(1− r0 − αi);
< 0, hi > − 1αi ln(1− r0 − αi).
(3.33)
Proof: See Appendix B.
†If β = 0, the CEV model reduces to the GBM model. Then, the optimal investment strategies of the reinsurer and the insurers are given
by b∗L(t) =
1
γLϕ
L(t)
(r−r0)
σ2
, b∗i (t) =
1
(1−k1k2)ϕFi (t)
(
1
γi
+ ki
γj
) r−r0
σ2
, i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}.
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Corollary 2 states that the effect of the delay weight on the optimal investment strategy depends on the delay time.
For the reinsurer, when the delay time hL > − 1αL ln(1−r0−αL), the greater the delay weight, the less money is invested
in the risky asset. On the contrary, when the delay time hL < − 1αL ln(1 − r0 − αL), the greater the delay weight, the
more money is invested in the risky asset. The optimal investment strategies of the insurers have similar rules. In other
words, when the delay time selected by the reinsurer (insurer i) is relatively long, the greater the weight of the integrated
performance in the past, the more conservative the strategy made by the reinsurer (insurer i). On the contrary, when
the memory time is relatively short, the smaller the weight of integrated performance in the past, the more conservative
investment strategy will be adopted. It also illustrates that the reinsurer and insurers manage investment risk according
to the relevant parameters of delay.
3.2 Verification theorem
In order to prove that the equilibrium strategy given in Theorem 1 is indeed optimal for all three parties of the hybrid
game, we give a verification theorem in this section. For i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, let
AFiV Fi(t, xˆi, yi, yj , s)
= V Fit + V
Fi
xˆi
[
θiai − kiθjaj − (p(t)− ai)(1− qi(t)) + ki(p(t)− aj)(1− q∗j (t)) +Aixi − kiAjxj +Biyi − kiBjyj
+ Cizi − kiCjzj + (r − r0)(bi(t)− kib∗j (t))
]
+
1
2
[
(qi(t)σi)
2 + (kiq
∗
j (t)σj)
2 − 2qi(t)σikiq∗j (t)σjρ
+ (bi(t)− kib∗j (t))2σ2s2β
]
V Fixˆixˆi + (xi − αiyi − e−αihizi)V Fiyi + (xj − αjyj − e−αjhjzj)V Fiyj
+ rsV Fis +
1
2
σ2s2β+2V Fiss + (bi(t)− kib∗j (t))σ2s2β+1V Fixˆis, (3.34)
ALV L(t, xL, yL, s)
= V Lt + V
L
xL
[
(p(t)− a1)(1− q∗1(t)) + (p(t)− a2)(1− q∗2(t)) + (r − r0)bL(t) +ALxL +BLyL + CLzL
]
+
1
2
[
(1− q∗1(t))2(σ1)2 + (1− q∗2(t))2(σ2)2 + (bL(t))2σ2s2β + 2(1− q∗1(t))(1− q∗2(t))σ1σ2ρ
]
V LxLxL
+ (xL − αLyL − e−αLhLzL)V LyL + rsV Ls +
1
2
σ2s2β+2V Lss + bL(t)σ
2s2β+1V LxLs. (3.35)
We first give the following lemmas:
Lemma 1 Let MFi = R × R+ × R+ × R+, i ∈ {1, 2}. Take a sequence of bounded open sets MFi1 ,MFi2 ,MFi3 , · · · ,
with MFin ⊂ MFin+1 ⊂ MFi , n = 1, 2, · · · , and MFi = ∪nMFin . For (xˆi, yi, yj , s) ∈ MFin , let τn be the exit time of
(Xˆi(t), Yi(t), Yj(t), S(t)) from MFin . Then, for n = 1, 2, · · · , Et,xˆi,yi,yj ,s
{[
V Fi(τn ∧ T, Xˆi(τn ∧ T ), Yi(τn ∧ T ), Yj(τn ∧
T ), S(τn ∧ T ))
]2}
< +∞.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Lemma 2 Let ML = R+ × R+ × R+. Take a sequence of bounded open sets ML1 ,ML2 ,ML3 , · · · , with MLn ⊂MLn+1 ⊂
ML, n = 1, 2, · · · , and ML = ∪nMLn . For (xL, yL, s) ∈ MLn , let τn be the exit time of (XL(t), YL(t), S(t)) from MLn .
Then, for n = 1, 2, · · · , Et,xL,yL,s
{[
V L(τn ∧ T,XL(τn ∧ T ), YL(τn ∧ T ), S(τn ∧ T ))
]2}
< +∞.
Proof: The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma 1.
Theorem 2 (Verification theorem) The equilibrium strategy (p∗(t), b∗L(t), q
∗
1(t), b
∗
1(t), q
∗
2(t), b
∗
2(t)) described in Theorem
1 achieves optimality in ΠL ×Π1 ×Π2.
Proof: See Appendix D.
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3.3 Special cases
In what follows, we present several special cases of our model.
Special case 1: If the reinsurer and two insurers do not consider the effect of the bounded memory, i.e., ηL =
ηi = hL = hi = αL = αi = 0, then BL = Bi = CL = Ci = 0 and AL = Ai = r0, i ∈ {1, 2}. The optimal investment
strategies, denoted as bˆ∗L(t), bˆ
∗
i (t), i ∈ {1, 2}, are given by
bˆ∗L(t) =
e−r0(T−t)s−2β
γL
[ (r − r0)
σ2
− 2βg1(t)
]
= b∗L(t)e
ηL
1+ηL
(1−r0−αL−e−αLhL )(T−t), (3.36)
bˆ∗i (t) =
e−r0(T−t)s−2β
(1− k1k2)
( 1
γi
+
ki
γj
)[r − r0
σ2
− 2βg1(t)
]
= b∗i (t)e
ηi
1+ηi
(1−r0−αi−e−αihi )(T−t), (3.37)
where g1(t) is given by (A.54). The optimal reinsurance premium strategy and the optimal reinsurance strategies in the
interior case (i.e., Case (10) in Theorem 1) become
pˆ∗(t) =
PˆN (t)
PˆD(t)
, qˆ∗i (t) =
e−r0(T−t)
1− k1k2ρ2
[ PˆN (t)
PˆD(t)
− ai
γiσ2i
+
kiρ(
PˆN (t)
PˆD(t)
− aj)
γjσjσi
]
, i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, (3.38)
where
PˆN (t) =er0(T−t)(σ1σ2)2(γ2DˆF1 + γ1DˆF2) + 2a1σ22γ2Dˆ
F˜1 + 2a2σ
2
1γ1Dˆ
F˜2 + (a1 + a2)ρσ1σ2Dˆ
F12 ,
PˆD(t) =2σ22γ2Dˆ
F˜1 + 2σ21γ1Dˆ
F˜2 + 2ρσ1σ2Dˆ
F12 , DˆFi = γi(1− k1k2ρ2) + γL[1 + kjρ2 + σjρ
σi
(1 + kj)], i 6= j ∈ {1, 2},
DˆF˜i =1 +
γL(1 + (kjρ)
2 + 2kjρ
2)
2γi(1− k1k2ρ2) , i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, Dˆ
F12 = k1γ1 + k2γ2 +
γL(1 + k1 + k2 + k1k2ρ
2)
1− k1k2ρ2 .
From (3.36) and (3.37), we can find that when 1 − r0 − αL − e−αLhL ≥ 0, then bˆ∗L(t) ≥ b∗L(t). That is, when the
delay time satisfies hL ≥ − 1αL ln(1− r0−αL), the amount of investment in the risky asset without delay is greater than
that with delay, that is to say, delay makes the investment strategy more conservative in this case. On the contrary,
when 1 − r0 − αL − e−αLhL < 0, then bˆ∗L(t) < b∗L(t). That is to say, when the reinsurer’s delay time hL is less than
− 1αL ln(1− r0 − αL), the amount invested in the risky asset with delay is larger than that without delay, i.e., the delay
factor stimulates the investment in this case. Accordingly, the investment strategies of insurers have similar analysis.
Generally speaking, delay factor discourages or stimulates investment depending on the length of the delay.
Corollary 3 For i ∈ {1, 2}, we have
lim
t→T
[bˆ∗L(t)− b∗L(t)] = 0, lim
t→T
[bˆ∗i (t)− b∗i (t)] = 0, lim
t→T
[pˆ∗(t)− p∗(t)] = 0, lim
t→T
[qˆ∗i (t)− q∗i (t)] = 0, (3.39)
where p∗(t) and q∗i (t), i ∈ {1, 2} are the optimal reinsurance premium strategy and the optimal reinsurance strategies
respectively in Case (10) of Theorem 1.
Proof: This corollary is easily obtained by (3.23), (3.24), (3.25), (A.99), (3.36), (3.37) and (3.38), and we omits
the proof here.
Corollary 3 indicates that when time t tends to the terminal time T , the equilibrium strategy with delay and without
delay will tend to be consistent. In particular, the equilibrium strategy with delay is equal to that without delay at the
terminal time T .
Special case 2: We study a stochastic differential reinsurance-investment game between one reinsurer and one
insurer, i.e., i = j = 1. Then, ρ = 1, cF = c1 = (1 + θ1)a1, ki = kj = 0. At this point, the hybrid game becomes a
13
pure Stackelberg game problem. Using the method similar to that in Section 3.1, we can get the equilibrium strategy
(p˜∗(t), b˜∗L(t), q˜
∗
1(t), b˜
∗
1(t)) and value functions V˜
L(t, xL, yL, s), V˜
F1(t, x1, y1, s). b˜
∗
L(t) and b˜
∗
1(t) are given by
b˜∗L(t) =
1
γLϕL(t)s2β
[ (r − r0)
σ2
− 2βg1(t)
]
, b˜∗1(t) =
1
γ1ϕF1(t)s2β
[ (r − r0)
σ2
− 2βg1(t)
]
.
p˜∗(t) and q˜∗1(t) under different cases are given by Table 3, where ϕ
L(t), ϕF1(t) and g1(t) are given by (A.67), (A.51) and
Table 3: The optimal premium strategy and the optimal reinsurance strategy under different cases.
Cases p∗(t) q∗1(t)
(1) N cF1(t) ≥ 1 ∀p ∈ [cF , c¯] 1
(2) N c¯F1(t) ≤MF1(t) c¯ N c¯F1(t)
(3) MF1(t) ≤ N cF1(t) < 1 cF N cF1(t)
(4) N cF1(t) < MF1(t) < N c¯F1(t) a1 +M
F1(t)γ1σ
2
1ϕ
F1(t) MF1(t)
(A.54), respectively; N cF1(t), N c¯F1(t) and MF1(t) are given by (A.70). The value function of the reinsurer is given by
V˜ L(t, xL, yL, s) =− 1
γL
exp{−γLϕL(t)(xL + ηLyL) + g1(t)s−2β + gL2 (t)},
the value function of the insurer is given by
V˜ F1(t, x1, y1, s) =− 1
γ1
exp{−γ1ϕF1(t)(x1 + η1y1) + g1(t)s−2β + gF12 (t)},
where gL2 (t) and g
F1
2 (t) under different cases are given by Table 4, g(t) is given by (A.58),
Table 4: gL2 (t) and g
F1
2 (t) under different cases.
Cases gL2 (t) g
F1
2 (t)
Case(1) g0La2 (t) g
0F˜1a
2 (t)
Case(2) g0Lb12 (t) g
0F˜1b1
2 (t)
Case(3) g0Lb22 (t) g
0F˜1b2
2 (t)
Case(4) g0Lb32 (t) g
0F˜1b3
2 (t)
g0La2 (t) = g(t),
g0Lb12 (t) = g(t) +
γ2Lσ
2
1
4(AL + ηL)
[(ϕL(t))2 − 1] +
∫ t
T
θ¯a1γLϕ
L(s)[1 +
γLϕ
L(s)
γ1ϕF1(s)
]ds
−
∫ t
T
(θ¯a1)
2γLϕ
L(s)
σ21γ1ϕ
F1(s)
[1 +
γLϕ
L(s)
2γ1ϕF1(s)
]ds,
g0Lb22 (t) = g(t) +
γ2Lσ
2
1
4(AL + ηL)
[(ϕL(t))2 − 1] +
∫ t
T
θ1a1γLϕ
L(s)[1 +
γLϕ
L(s)
γ1ϕF1(s)
]ds
−
∫ t
T
(θ1a1)
2γLϕ
L(s)
σ21γ1ϕ
F1(s)
[1 +
γLϕ
L(s)
2γ1ϕF1(s)
]ds,
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g0Lb32 (t) = g(t) +
γ2Lσ
2
1
4(AL + ηL)
[(ϕL(t))2 − 1] + σ
2
1
2
∫ t
T
γLϕ
L(s)(γ1ϕ
F1(s) + γLϕ
L(s))MF1(s)ds,
g0F˜1a2 (t) = g(t)−
γ1θ1a1
A1 + η1
[ϕF1(t)− 1] + γ
2
1σ
2
1
4(A1 + η1)
[(ϕF1(t))2 − 1],
g0F˜1b12 (t) = g(t) +
γ1(θ¯ − θ1)a1
A1 + η1
[ϕF1(t)− 1]− (θ¯a1)
2
2σ21
(T − t),
g0F˜1b22 (t) = g(t)−
(θ1a1)
2
2σ21
(T − t),
g0F˜1b32 (t) = g(t)−
γ1θ1a1
A1 + η1
[ϕF1(t)− 1]− γ21σ21
∫ t
T
(ϕF1(s))2MF1(s)ds+
1
2
γ21σ
2
1
∫ t
T
(ϕF1(s))2(MF1(s))2ds.
Similar to Chen and Shen (2018), we can get that when the equilibrium is achieved in the interior case (i.e., Case
(4) in Table 3), the optimal reinsurance premium follows the variance premium principle. In other words, for every one
unit of risk, the total instantaneous reinsurance premium associated with the ceded proportion (1− q˜∗1(t))100% can be
written as
p˜∗(t)(1− q˜∗1(t)) = a1(1− q˜∗1(t)) + [γ1ϕF1(t) + γLϕL(t)]σ21(1− q˜∗1(t))2,
where the first term accounts for the mean component, and the second for the variance component.
Corollary 4 If β ≥ 0, some properties of the optimal investment strategies (i.e., b˜∗L(t), b˜∗1(t)), optimal premium strategy
(i.e., p˜∗(t)) and optimal reinsurance strategy (i.e., q˜∗1(t)) of Case 4 in Table 3 are given in Table 5, (3.40), (3.41), (3.42)
and (3.43).
Table 5: The properties of (p˜∗(t), b˜∗L(t), q˜
∗
1(t), b˜
∗
1(t)).
∂b˜∗L(t)
∂γL
∂b˜∗L(t)
∂hL
∂b˜∗1(t)
∂γ1
∂b˜∗1(t)
∂h1
∂p˜∗(t)
∂γL
∂p˜∗(t)
∂hL
∂q˜∗1 (t)
∂γ1
∂q˜∗1 (t)
∂h1
− − − − + + − −
∂b˜∗L(t)
∂αL
=

> 0, αL > − 1hL ln
1
hL
;
= 0, αL = − 1hL ln
1
hL
;
< 0, αL < − 1hL ln
1
hL
.
∂b˜∗1(t)
∂α1
=

> 0, α1 > − 1h1 ln
1
h1
;
= 0, α1 = − 1h1 ln
1
h1
;
< 0, α1 < − 1h1 ln
1
h1
.
(3.40)
∂p˜∗(t)
∂αL
=

< 0, αL > − 1hL ln
1
hL
;
= 0, αL = − 1hL ln
1
hL
;
> 0, αL < − 1hL ln
1
hL
.
∂q˜∗1(t)
∂α1
=

> 0, α1 > − 1h1 ln
1
h1
;
= 0, α1 = − 1h1 ln
1
h1
;
< 0, α1 < − 1h1 ln
1
h1
.
(3.41)
If r0 + αL < 1 and r0 + α1 < 1, then
∂b˜∗L(t)
∂ηL
=

> 0, hL < − 1αL ln(1− r0 − αL);
= 0, hL = − 1αL ln(1− r0 − αL);
< 0, hL > − 1αL ln(1− r0 − αL).
∂b˜∗1(t)
∂η1
=

> 0, h1 < − 1α1 ln(1− r0 − α1);
= 0, h1 = − 1α1 ln(1− r0 − α1);
< 0, h1 > − 1α1 ln(1− r0 − α1).
(3.42)
∂p˜∗(t)
∂ηL
=

< 0, hL < − 1αL ln(1− r0 − αL);
= 0, hL = − 1αL ln(1− r0 − αL);
> 0, hL > − 1αL ln(1− r0 − αL).
∂q˜∗1(t)
∂η1
=

> 0, h1 < − 1α1 ln(1− r0 − α1);
= 0, h1 = − 1α1 ln(1− r0 − α1);
< 0, h1 > − 1α1 ln(1− r0 − α1).
(3.43)
Proof: The proof of this corollary is similar to that of Corollary 2.
Further, if the reinsurer and the insurer do not consider the effect of the delay, i.e., ηL = η1 = hL = h1 = αL = α1 = 0,
then BL = B1 = CL = C1 = 0 and AL = A1 = r0. The optimal reinsurance premium and the optimal reinsurance
strategy are the same as that in the case of ρL = ρF in the literature Chen and Shen (2018).
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4 Sensitivity analysis
To illustrate the sensitivities of the equilibrium strategy (p∗(·), b∗L(·); q∗1(·), b∗1(·); q∗2(·), b∗2(·)) with respect to the model
parameters, we conduct numerical experiments in this section. Throughout this section, unless stated otherwise, the
basic model parameters are given in Table 6, Table 7 and Table8.‡
Table 6: The parameter values of the financial assets.
r0 r σ β s0 T
0.05 0.1 0.4 1 1 10
Table 7: The parameter values of the reinsurer.
θ¯ hL αL ηL γL
2 2 0.3 0.05 0.1
Table 8: The parameter values of insurers.
The parameter values of insurer 1 The parameter values of insurer 2
Parameter Value Parameter Value
λ1
µ1
σ1
θ1
h1
α1
η1
γ1
k1
ρ
0.8
5
3
1.2
2
0.5
0.05
2
0.4
0.3
λ2
µ2
σ2
θ2
h2
α2
η2
γ2
k2
/
1
4
2
1
3
0.3
/
3
0.3
/
4.1 Sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium investment strategy
Figure 2 shows the change in the risky asset price over time and the optimal investment strategies with and without
delay over time. From Theorem 1, we can find that
∂b∗L(t)
∂s = − 2βs b∗L(t) and ∂b
∗
i (t)
∂s = − 2βs b∗i (t), i ∈ {1, 2}. It is easy to
find that
∂b∗L(t)
∂s < 0 and
∂b∗i (t)
∂s < 0, when β = 1. That is, the wealth invested in the risky asset is negatively correlated
with the price of the risky asset, which is consistent with the trend of curves in Figure 2. Under the setting of parameters
in Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8, we have hL ≥ − 1αL ln(1− r0 − αL) and hi ≥ − 1αi ln(1− r0 − αi), i ∈ {1, 2}. According
to Special case 1, the amount invested in the risky asset with delay is lower than that without delay, which is consistent
with Figure 2. That is, the delay factor will urge the investor to shrink the position invested in the risky asset and make
the investment strategy more conservative when the delay time considered is greater than a certain value. Furthermore,
the gap between the investment strategy with delay and the investment strategy without delay will decrease with the
increase of time t. And they completely coincide at terminal time T .
‡For i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, we can get that Ai = 11+ηi [r0 − (αi + ηi)ηi − ηie
−αihi ] due to Ai = r0 − Bi − Ci, Ci = ηie−αihi and Bie−αihi =
(αi+Ai+ηi)Ci. From the condition in Theorem 1, A1 +η1 = A2 +η2, we can get that ηj =
(r0−1+e−αihi+αi)ηi
(r0−1+e−αjhj+αj)+(αj−αi+e−αjhj−e−αihi )ηi
.
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Figure 2: b∗L(t), b
∗
1(t) and b
∗
2(t) with and without delay.
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Figure 3: Effects of β on b∗L(0), b
∗
1(0) and b
∗
2(0).
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Figure 4: Effects of risk aversion coefficients and sensitivity coefficients on optimal investment strategies.
Figure 3 indicates the influence of the constant elasticity parameter β on optimal investment strategies at the initial
moment, including β < 0 and β > 0. In Figure 3, we can note that both the reinsurer’s and insurers’ investment
strategies will increase as β increases. The investment amount is negative when elasticity parameter β < 0, and the
investment amount is positive when the elasticity parameter β > 0. In other words, positive elasticity parameter results
in a positive hedging demand; the hedging demand is negative for negative elasticity parameter, which is consistent with
the description in Section 3.1.
Figure 4 indicates the impacts of the risk aversion coefficients (i.e., γL, γ1, γ2) and sensitivity coefficients (i.e., k1, k2)
on optimal investment strategies at the initial moment. Both 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) show that the greater the risk aversion
coefficient, the less the amount invested in the risky asset, which is consistent with the actual situation. Both 4(b) and
4(c) show that for insurer i (i ∈ {1, 2}), the greater the sensitivity coefficient ki, the more the insurer i invests in the
risky asset. Because the sensitivity coefficient ki reflects the degree to which insurer i cares about the terminal wealth
of its competitor (i.e., insurer j, j 6= i ∈ {1, 2}), the larger the ki, the more the insurer i cares about the performance
of its opponent. Therefore, when the sensitivity coefficient ki is larger, insurer i is more inclined to invest more money
into the risky asset for increasing its wealth.
Figure 5 indicates the effects of delay parameters (i.e., hL, ηL, αL, h1, η1, α1, h2, η2 and α2) on optimal investment
strategies (i.e., b∗L(0), b
∗
1(0) and b
∗
2(0)), respectively. Both 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) show that when the delay weight defined,
the longer the delay time, the less money is invested in the risky asset. That is, when the delay time is longer, the
reinsurer and the insurers adopt more conservative and robust investment strategies to control their risk. As can be
seen from 5(a), for the reinsurer, when the delay time is within a certain range, the greater the delay weight, the more
money is invested in the risky asset. Otherwise, the opposite situation occurs. From the range of abscissa in 5(b) and
5(c), we can know that, h1 > − 1α1 ln(1 − r0 − α1) = 1.5970 and h2 > − 1α2 ln(1 − r0 − α2) = 1.4359. § For insurer i,
i ∈ {1, 2}, when the delay time is greater than the certain value, the greater the delay weight ηi is, the less insurer i
invests in the risky asset, i.e.,
∂b∗i (t)
∂ηi
< 0, which is consistent with the case of hi > − 1αi ln(1− r0−αi) in equation (3.33).
Subfigures 5(d), 5(e) and 5(f) show the effects of αL, α1 and α2 on b
∗
L(0), b
∗
1(0) and b
∗
2(0), respectively. These three
subgraphs illustrate that the impact of the average parameter on the optimal investment strategy will change with its
size, which is consistent with equation (3.32).
4.2 Sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium reinsurance strategy
Figure 6 shows the changes of the reinsurer’s optimal premium strategy and the insurers’ optimal reinsurance strategies
with and without delay over time. Table 9 shows numerical results corresponding to Figure 6. When t ≤ 6, it satisfies
§Note: Because ηj =
(r0−1+e−αihi+αi)ηi
(r0−1+e−αjhj+αj)+(αj−αi+e−αjhj−e−αihi )ηi
for i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, the selection of abscissa, delay time parameters
and the delay weight parameters should ensure that ηi ∈ (0, 1), i ∈ {1, 2}.
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Figure 5: Effects of delay parameters on optimal investment strategies.
Table 9: Numerical results corresponding to Figure 6.
t 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
with delay
p∗(t) 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 11.831 11.419 11.030 10.661
q∗1(t) 0.294 0.310 0.327 0.345 0.364 0.384 0.406 0.419 0.419 0.419 0.419
q∗2(t) 0.429 0.452 0.477 0.504 0.532 0.561 0.592 0.612 0.612 0.612 0.612
without delay
p∗(t) 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 11.739 11.361 11.002 10.661
q∗1(t) 0.305 0.321 0.337 0.355 0.373 0.392 0.412 0.419 0.419 0.419 0.419
q∗2(t) 0.446 0.468 0.492 0.518 0.544 0.572 0.601 0.612 0.612 0.612 0.612
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Figure 6: p∗(t), q∗1(t) and q
∗
2(t) with and without delay.
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conditions in Case (8) of Theorem 1. In this case, the reinsurer’s optimal premium strategy takes its upper bound p∗(t) =
c¯ = (1 + θ¯)λFµF = 12; the optimal reserve proportional of insurer i (i ∈ {1, 2}) is q∗i (t) = K[N c¯Fi(t) + kiρσjσi N c¯Fj (t)],
which is an increasing function of t. When t ≥ 7, it satisfies conditions in Case (10) of Theorem 1. In this case,
the reinsurer’s optimal premium strategy is p∗(t) = P
N (t)
PD(t)
, which is a decreasing function of t; the optimal reserve
proportional of insurer i (i ∈ {1, 2}) is q∗i (t) = K[
PN (t)
PD(t)
−ai
γiσ2iϕ
Fi (t)
+
kiρ(
PN (t)
PD(t)
−aj)
γjσ1σ2ϕ
Fj (t)
]. Furthermore, from Figure 6, we can find
that the price of reinsurance premium with delay is not lower than that without delay, and the reserve proportional with
delay is not higher than that without delay. This indicates that delay factors can urge the reinsurer and insurers to hedge
risk by raising the price of reinsurance premium or reducing the reserve proportional under the setting of parameters in
Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8. Furthermore, in Case (10), as time goes on, the gap between the reinsurance premium price
with delay and that without delay becomes smaller and smaller, and the two are completely equal until the terminal
time T .
Since Case (10) in Theorem 1 is the most general situation in this paper, we will analyze the premium strategy and
reinsurance strategies in Case (10) below. For convenience, we choose the strategies at t=9 for analysis.
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Figure 7: Effects of sensitivity parameters on optimal reinsurance strategies.
Figure 7 illustrates the effects of sensitive parameters (i.e., k1, k2) on optimal reinsurance strategies (i.e., q
∗
1(9), q
∗
2(9))
and optimal premium strategy (i.e., p∗(9)), respectively. The more sensitive insurer i (i ∈ {1, 2}) is to the wealth of
insurer j (j 6= i ∈ {1, 2}), (that is to say, ki is bigger), the higher the reservation ratio of insurer i is, and the lower
the premium price is. This is because the more sensitive the insurer is to the wealth level of the other party, the more
serious the psychology of comparison will be, which makes the insurer more eager to widen the wealth gap with its
opponent. This comparing mentality leads to its willingness to assume more risk of random claims than to spend money
on reinsurance contracts. This phenomenon in turn leads to lower the premium price. In summary, competitive factors
between the two insurers reduce the demand for reinsurance and the price of reinsurance premiums.
Three subgraphs in Figure 8 illustrate the sensitivity of p∗(9), q∗1(9) and q
∗
2(9) to the γL, γ1 and γ2, respectively.
Subfigures 8(a), 8(b) and 8(c) indicate that the reinsurance premium price will increase with the increase of risk aversion
coefficients. This is understandable, since the more risk-averse the reinsurer is, the more inclined the reinsurer is to
reduce its risk by raising the premium price; the more risk-averse insurers are, the more demand for reinsurance will
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Figure 8: Effects of risk aversion coefficients on optimal strategies.
increase, leading to an increase in the price of reinsurance premium. From 8(d), we can find that the reserve proportions
of two insurers will increase with the increase of the reinsurer’s risk aversion coefficient. This phenomenon is because that
the more risk-averse the reinsurer is, the higher the reinsurance premium price will be, which will reduce the reinsurance
demand and lead to an increase in the reserve level of insurers. 8(e) and 8(f) show that the reserve proportion of
insurer i (i ∈ {1, 2}) will decrease with the increase of its risk aversion coefficient γi and increase with the increase of its
competitor’s (i.e., insurer j’s, j 6= i ∈ {1, 2}) risk aversion coefficient γj . Because when the insurer is more risk-averse,
it tends to sign a reinsurance contract to transfer part of its random claim risk; when its competitor is more risk-averse,
it prefers to increase its claim reserve ratio, but is not willing to spend money to buy reinsurance contracts due to the
psychology of comparison. To sum up, risk aversion factors increase the price of reinsurance premiums; the reinsurer’s
risk aversion factor reduces the insurers’ reinsurance demand; insurer’s risk aversion factor increases its own reinsurance
demand and reduces the reinsurance demand of its competitor.
Figure 9 indicates the effects of delay parameters (i.e., hL, ηL, αL, h1, η1, α1, h2, η2 and α2) on optimal premium
strategy (i.e., p∗(9)) and reinsurance strategies (i.e., q∗1(9), q
∗
2(9)), respectively. As can be seen from 9(a), when the
delay weight is defined, the premium price increases with the increase of delay time. Furthermore, when the delay time
is less than a certain value, the larger the delay weight is, the lower the premium price is. When the delay time is greater
than this certain value, the larger the delay weight is, the higher the premium price is. Therefore, for the reinsurer, the
effect of the delay weight on the optimal premium strategy is related to the length of the delay time in Case (10) of
Theorem 1. From 9(b) and 9(c), we can see that for insurers, when the delay time takes a special interval, the longer
the delay time, the lower the reserve level; the larger the delay weight, the lower the reserve level. Subfigures 9(d), 9(e)
and 9(f) show the effects of αL, α1 and α2 on p
∗(9), q∗1(9) and q
∗
2(9), respectively. These three subgraphs illustrate that
the impact of the average parameter on the optimal premium strategy (or optimal reinsurance strategy) will change
with its size.
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Figure 9: Effects of delay parameters on optimal strategies.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we investigate a hybrid stochastic differential reinsurance and investment game, including a stochastic
Stackelberg differential subgame and a non-zero-sum stochastic differential subgame. One reinsurer and two insurers
are three players in the hybrid game. In view of the monopoly position of the reinsurer and the competitive relationship
between insurers in the market, we consider the reinsurer and two insurers as the leader and the followers of the Stack-
elberg game respectively, and model the insurers’ competition relationship as the non-zero-sum game. We investigate
the reinsurer’s premium pricing and investment optimization problem as well as insurers’ reinsurance and investment
optimization problem. Under the consideration of the performance-related capital inflow/outflow, the wealth processes
of the reinsurer and insurers are described by SDDEs. We derive the equilibrium strategy and value functions explicitly
by using the idea of backward induction and the dynamic programming approach. Then, we establish a verification
theorem for the optimality of the given strategy. Furthermore, we study several special cases of our model. Moreover,
some numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are presented to demonstrate the effects of the model parameters on
the equilibrium strategy.
The main findings are as follows: (1) the optimal reinsurance-investment strategies of two insurers interact with
each other and reflect the herd effect. (2) the optimal reinsurance strategies of insurers depend on the optimal premium
strategy. (3) competitive factors between two insurers reduce the demand for reinsurance and the price of reinsurance
premium. (4) the delay factor discourages or stimulates investment depending on the length of the delay. When the
delay time is greater than a certain value, the delay factor will make the investment become more conservative. On the
contrary, when the delay time is less than this certain value, the delay factor will stimulate investment. (5) the effect of
the delay weight on the equilibrium strategy is related to the length of the delay. When the delay time is greater than
a certain value, the optimal investment strategies and the optimal reinsurance strategies are negatively correlated with
the corresponding delay weight parameters; the optimal premium strategy is positively correlated with the reinsurer’s
delay weight. Conversely, when the delay time is less than this value, the opposite case occurs.
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Stochastic differential games between reinsurers and insurers are a very common social phenomenon and an important
current research issue in the economic and financial fields. In the future work, this study can be extended in the following
directions: one is introducing multi-asset investment, which is closer to reality; the other is considering regime switching
to better describe the stochastic market.
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Appendix A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: We solve the Stackelberg game problem by using the idea of backward induction mentioned in Section 2.4
and standard dynamic programming techniques.
Step 1 In the stochastic Stackelberg differential game, the reinsurer takes action first by announcing its any admis-
sible strategy (p(·), bL(·)) ∈ ΠL.
Step 2 Based on the reinsurer’s strategy (p(·), bL(·)) ∈ ΠL, we solve two insurers’ optimization problems (i.e., (2.19)
for i = 1, 2) under the CARA preference simultaneously. i 6= j ∈ {1, 2} in this step.
For the value function of insurer i, we conjecture that
V Fi(t, xˆi, yi, yj , s) = − 1
γi
exp{−γiϕFi(t)(xˆi + ηiyi − kiηjyj) + gFi1 (t)s−2β + gFi2 (t)}, (A.44)
where ϕFi(t), gFi1 (t) and g
Fi
2 (t) are deterministic, continuously differentiable functions with boundary conditions ϕ
Fi(T ) =
1, gFi1 (T ) = 0 and g
Fi
2 (T ) = 0. For insurer i, the HJB equation is
0 = sup
(qi(·),bi(·))∈Πi
{
V Fit + V
Fi
xˆi
[
θiai − kiθjaj − (p(t)− ai)(1− qi(t)) + ki(p(t)− aj)(1− q∗j (t))
+Aixi − kiAjxj +Biyi − kiBjyj + Cizi − kiCjzj + (r − r0)(bi(t)− kib∗j (t))
]
+
1
2
[
(qi(t)σi)
2
+ (kiq
∗
j (t)σj)
2 − 2qi(t)σikiq∗j (t)σjρ+ (bi(t)− kib∗j (t))2σ2s2β
]
V Fixˆixˆi + (xi − αiyi − e−αihizi)V Fiyi
+ (xj − αjyj − e−αjhjzj)V Fiyj + rsV Fis +
1
2
σ2s2β+2V Fiss + (bi(t)− kib∗j (t))σ2s2β+1V Fixˆis
}
. (A.45)
The first-order condition for maximizing the value in (A.45) gives that
0 =V Fixˆi [p(t)− ai] + [q∗i (t)σ2i − σikiq∗j (t)σjρ]V Fixˆixˆi , (A.46)
0 =(r − r0)V Fixˆi + [b∗i (t)− kib∗j (t)]σ2s2βV Fixˆixˆi + σ2s2β+1V Fixˆis. (A.47)
From (A.44), (A.46) and (A.47), we know that reinsurance strategy and investment strategy are independent. The
investment strategy of insurer i is independent of the investment strategy of the reinsurer. Then, α∗i (·, p(·), bL(·)) and
β∗i (·, p(·), bL(·)) could be written as α∗i (·, p(·)) and β∗i (·), respectively. Due to qi(t) ∈ [0, 1], we can get that
q∗i (t, p(t)) = α
∗
i (t, p(t)) =
[−(p(t)− ai)V Fixˆi
σ2i V
Fi
xˆixˆi
+
kiσjρq
∗
j (t)
σi
]
∨ 0 ∧ 1 =
[ p(t)− ai
γiσ2i ϕ
Fi(t)
+
kiρσjq
∗
j (t)
σi
]
∨ 0 ∧ 1, (A.48)
b∗i (t) = β
∗(t) = kib∗j (t)−
sV Fixˆis
V Fixˆixˆi
− (r − r0)V
Fi
xˆi
σ2s2βV Fixˆixˆi
= kib
∗
j (t) +
1
γiϕFi(t)s2β
[r − r0
σ2
− 2βgFi1 (t)
]
. (A.49)
Substitute the investment strategy (A.49) into the HJB equation (A.45). Then, we have
0 =V Fi
{
γixi
[− ϕFit − ϕFi(t)Ai − ϕFi(t)ηi]+ kiγixj[ϕFit + ϕFi(t)Aj + ϕFi(t)ηj]+ γiyi[− ϕFit ηi − ϕFi(t)Bi
+ ϕFi(t)ηiαi
]
+ kiγiyj
[
ϕFit ηj + ϕ
Fi(t)Bj − ϕFi(t)ηjαj
]
+ γiϕ
Fi(t)zi
[− Ci + ηie−αihi]+ kiγiϕFi(t)zj[Cj
− ηje−αjhj
]
+ s−2β
(dgFi1 (t)
dt
− 2βr0gFi1 (t)−
1
2
(r − r0)2
σ2
)}
+ V Fi
{dgFi2 (t)
dt
+ β(2β + 1)σ2gFi1 (t)
− γiϕFi(t)
[
θiai − kiθjaj − (p(t)− ai)(1− q∗i (t)) + ki(p(t)− aj)(1− q∗j (t))
]
+
1
2
(γiϕ
Fi(t))2
[
(q∗i (t)σi)
2 + (kiq
∗
j (t)σj)
2 − 2q∗i (t)σikiq∗j (t)σjρ
]}
. (A.50)
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Obviously, q∗i (t, p(t)) does not depend on the state variables xi, xj , yi, yj and s
−2β . Due to Ci = ηie−αihi , Bie−αihi =
(αi +Ai + ηi)Ci, Cj = ηje
−αjhj , Bje−αjhj = (αj +Aj + ηj)Cj , ϕFi(T ) = 1 and gFi1 (T ) = 0, we have
ϕFi(t) = exp{(Ai + ηi)(T − t)} = exp{(Aj + ηj)(T − t)} = ϕFj (t), (A.51)
gFi1 (t) = g1(t), (A.52)
and
0 =V Fi
{− γiϕFi(t)[θiai − kiθjaj − (p(t)− ai)(1− q∗i (t)) + ki(p(t)− aj)(1− q∗j (t))]
+
1
2
(γiϕ
Fi(t))2
[
(q∗i (t)σi)
2 + (kiq
∗
j (t)σj)
2 − 2q∗i (t)σikiq∗j (t)σjρ
]
+
dgFi2 (t)
dt
+ β(2β + 1)σ2gFi1 (t)
}
, (A.53)
where
g1(t) = − 1
4βr0
(
r − r0
σ
)2[1− exp{−2βr0(T − t)}]. (A.54)
Then, we have ϕF1(t) = ϕF2(t) and gF11 (t) = g
F2
1 (t) = g1(t). Assume that k1k2 < 1, by (A.49), we can get that
b∗i (t) =
s−2β
(1− k1k2)ϕFi(t) (
1
γi
+
ki
γj
)
[r − r0
σ2
− 2βg1(t)
]
. (A.55)
Due to p(t) ∈ [cF , c¯] and (A.48), we know that p(t)−aiγiσ2iϕFi (t) +
kiρσjq
∗
j (t)
σi
> 0. Then,
q∗i (t, p(t)) = α
∗
i (t, p(t)) =
[ p(t)− ai
γiσ2i ϕ
Fi(t)
+
kiρσjq
∗
j (t)
σi
]
∧ 1. (A.56)
Assume that k1k2ρ
2 < 1. According to Bensoussan et al. (2014) and Deng et al. (2018), let q˜i(t, p(t)) be the solution
of the following system of equations: {
q˜1(t, p(t)) =
p(t)−a1
γ1σ21ϕ
F1 (t)
+ k1ρσ2q˜2(t)σ1 ,
q˜2(t, p(t)) =
p(t)−a2
γ2σ22ϕ
F2 (t)
+ k2ρσ1q˜1(t)σ2 .
(A.57)
Denote
g(t) = − (2β + 1)(r − r0)
2
4r0
[
(T − t) + 1
2βr0
(exp{−2βr0(T − t)} − 1)
]
. (A.58)
Then, we will discuss the following situations:
• Case (Fa) If q˜i(t, p(t)) ≥ 1, i ∈ {1, 2}, we have q∗i (t, p(t)) = 1. Substituting q∗i (t, p(t)) into (A.53) and integrating
from T to t gives
gFi2 (t) = g
Fia
2 (t)
.
=g(t)− γi(θiai − kiθjaj)
Ai + ηi
[ϕFi(t)− 1] + γ
2
i
[
σ2i + k
2
i σ
2
j − 2σikiσjρ
]
4(Ai + ηi)
[(ϕFi(t))2 − 1]. (A.59)
• Case (Fb) If q˜i(t, p(t)) ≥ 1 and q˜j(t, p(t)) < 1, i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, we have q∗i (t, p(t)) = 1 and q∗j (t, p(t)) =
p(t)−aj
γjσ2jϕ
Fj (t)
+
kjρσi
σj
. Substituting q∗i (t, p(t)) and q
∗
j (t, p(t)) into (A.53) and integrating from T to t gives
gFi2 (t) = g(t)−
γi(θiai − kiθjaj)
Ai + ηi
[ϕFi(t)− 1] + γ
2
i σ
2
i [1 + (k1k2ρ)
2 − 2k1k2ρ2]
4(Ai + ηi)
[(ϕFi(t))2 − 1]
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− kiγi
γjσ2j
[1 +
kiγi
2γj
]
∫ t
T
(p(s)− aj)2ds− kiγi[−1 + kjρσi
σj
+
k1k2ργiσi
γjσj
− ρσiγi
γjσj
]
∫ t
T
(p(s)− aj)ϕFi(s)ds, (A.60)
and
g
Fj
2 (t) =g(t)−
γj(θjaj − kjθiai)
Aj + ηj
[ϕFj (t)− 1] + (kjγjσi)
2(1− ρ2)
4(Aj + ηj)
[(ϕFj (t))2 − 1] + 1
2(σj)2
∫ t
T
(p(s)− aj)2ds
− γj(1− kjρσi
σj
)
∫ t
T
(p(s)− aj)ϕFj (s)ds. (A.61)
• Case (Fc) If q˜i(t, p(t)) < 1, i ∈ {1, 2}, we have q∗i (t, p(t)) = q˜i(t, p(t)). Substituting q∗i (t, p(t)) into (A.53) and
integrating from T to t gives
gFi2 (t) = g(t)−
γi(θiai − kiθjaj)
Ai + ηi
[ϕFi(t)− 1]− γi
∫ t
T
ϕFi(s)(p(s)− ai)ds+ kiγi
∫ t
T
ϕFi(s)(p(s)− aj)ds
+
1− (k1k2ρ)2
2(1− k1k2ρ2)2(σi)2
∫ t
T
(p(s)− ai)2ds− kiγi[2γj(1− k1k2ρ
2) + kiγi(1− ρ2)]
2(1− k1k2ρ2)2(γjσj)2
∫ t
T
(p(s)− aj)2ds
− kiρ[−γi(1− k1k2) + kjγj(1− k1k2ρ
2)]
(1− k1k2ρ2)2σ1σ2γj
∫ t
T
(p(s)− ai)(p(s)− aj)ds. (A.62)
Step 3 Knowing that insurer i would execute its reinsurance strategy and investment strategy according to (A.48)
and (A.55), the reinsurer then decides on its optimal strategy (p∗(·), b∗L(·)) ∈ ΠL.
For the value function of the reinsurer, we conjecture that
V L(t, xL, yL, s) = − 1
γL
exp{−γLϕL(t)(xL + ηLyL) + gL1 (t)s−2β + gL2 (t)}, (A.63)
where ϕL(t), gL1 (t) and g
L
2 (t) are deterministic, continuously differentiable functions with boundary conditions ϕ
L(T ) =
1, gL1 (T ) = 0 and g
L
2 (T ) = 0. The HJB equation of the reinsurer is
0 = sup
(p(·),bL(·))∈ΠL
{
V Lt + V
L
xL
[
(p(t)− a1)(1− q∗1(t)) + (p(t)− a2)(1− q∗2(t)) + (r − r0)bL(t) +ALxL +BLyL + CLzL
]
+
1
2
[
(1− q∗1(t))2(σ1)2 + (1− q∗2(t))2(σ2)2 + (bL(t))2σ2s2β + 2(1− q∗1(t))(1− q∗2(t))σ1σ2ρ
]
V LxLxL
+ (xL − αLyL − e−αLhLzL)V LyL + rsV Ls +
1
2
σ2s2β+2V Lss + bL(t)σ
2s2β+1V LxLs
}
. (A.64)
The first-order condition about bL(t) for maximizing the value in (A.64) gives that
b∗L(t) = −
(r − r0)
σ2s2β
V LxL
V LxLxL
− s V
L
xLs
V LxLxL
=
s−2β
γLϕL(t)
[
(r − r0)
σ2
− 2βgL1 (t)
]
. (A.65)
Substitute the investment strategy (A.65) into the HJB equation (A.64). Then, we have
0 = sup
p(·)∈[cF ,c¯]
V L
{
γLxL[−ϕLt − ϕL(t)AL − ϕL(t)ηL] + γLyL[−ϕLt ηL − ϕL(t)BL + ϕL(t)ηLαL]
− γLϕL(t)[CLzL − ηLe−αLhLzL] + s−2β
[dgL1 (t)
dt
− 2βr0gL1 (t)−
1
2
(
r − r0
σ
)2
]
+
dgL2 (t)
dt
+ β(2β + 1)σ2gL1 (t)− γLϕL(t)[(p(t)− a1)(1− q∗1(t)) + (p(t)− a2)(1− q∗2(t))]
+
1
2
γ2L(ϕ
L(t))2[(1− q∗1(t))2σ21 + (1− q∗2(t))2σ22 + 2(1− q∗1(t))(1− q∗2(t))σ1σ2ρ]
}
. (A.66)
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Obviously, p(t) does not depend on the state variables xL, yL and s
−2β . Then, we have
ϕL(t) = exp{(AL + ηL)(T − t)}, (A.67)
gL1 (t) =g1(t), (A.68)
0 = sup
p(·)∈[cF ,c¯]
{dgL2 (t)
dt
+ β(2β + 1)σ2gL1 (t)− γLϕL(t)[(p(t)− a1)(1− q∗1(t)) + (p(t)− a2)(1− q∗2(t))]
+
1
2
γ2L(ϕ
L(t))2[(1− q∗1(t))2σ21 + (1− q∗2(t))2σ22 + 2(1− q∗1(t))(1− q∗2(t))σ1σ2ρ]
}
. (A.69)
To simplify our presentation, for i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, we denote
KF˜i = (
γjσ
2
j
γiσ2i
+
kiρσj
σi
)(1− kjρσi
σj
), KFi = (1 +
kiργiσi
γjσj
)(1− kiρσj
σi
), N cFi(t) =
cF − ai
γiσ2i ϕ
Fi(t)
,
N c¯Fi(t) =
c¯− ai
γiσ2i ϕ
Fi(t)
, NaFi(t) =
aj − ai
γiσ2i ϕ
Fi(t)
, MFi(t) =
γiϕ
Fi(t) + γLϕ
L(t)
2γiϕFi(t) + γLϕL(t)
, K =
1
1− k1k2ρ2 . (A.70)
For the premium strategy p(t), we discuss it in the following situations:
• Case (La) If q˜i(t) ≥ 1, i = 1, 2, we have q∗1(t, p(t)) = 1 and q∗2(t, p(t)) = 1. Substituting q∗1(t, p(t)) and q∗2(t, p(t))
into (A.69), we can get that
0 = sup
p(·)∈[cF ,c¯]
{dgL2 (t)
dt
+ β(2β + 1)σ2gL1 (t)
}
. (A.71)
Then,
p∗(t) = p, q∗1(t, p
∗(t)) = 1, q∗2(t, p
∗(t)) = 1, (A.72)
where p is an arbitrary value in the interval [cF , c¯]. The precondition q˜i(t) ≥ 1 (i = 1, 2) becomes N cFi(t)+ kiρσjσi ≥
1, i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}. By equation (A.71) and gL2 (T ) = 0, we can get that
gL2 (t) = g
La
2 (t)
.
= g(t). (A.73)
• Case (Lb) If q˜i(t) ≥ 1, q˜j(t) < 1, i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, we have q∗i (t, p(t)) = 1 and q∗j (t, p(t)) = p(t)−ajγjσ2jϕFj (t) +
kjρσi
σj
.
Substituting q∗i (t, p(t)) and q
∗
j (t, p(t)) into (A.69) and simplifying gives
0 = sup
p(·)∈[cF ,c¯]
{dgL2 (t)
dt
+ β(2β + 1)σ2gL1 (t)− (p(t)− aj)γLϕL(t)(1−
kjρσi
σj
)[1 +
γLϕ
L(t)
γjϕFj (t)
]
+
1
2
(γLϕ
L(t))2(σj − kjρσi)2 + (p(t)− aj)2 γLϕ
L(t)
γjσ2jϕ
Fj (t)
[1 +
1
2
γLϕ
L(t)
γjϕFj (t)
]
}
. (A.74)
The first-order condition about p(t) for maximizing the value in equation (A.74) gives
p∗(t) = [aj + γjσ2jϕ
Fj (t)(1− kjρσi
σj
)MFj (t)] ∨ cF ∧ c¯. (A.75)
• Subcase (Lb1) If aj + γjσ2jϕ
Fj (t)(1− kjρσiσj )MFj (t) ≥ c¯, we have
p∗(t) = c¯, q∗i (t, p
∗(t)) = 1, q∗j (t, p
∗(t)) = N c¯Fj (t) +
kjρσi
σj
. (A.76)
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The preconditions become K[N c¯Fi(t) +
kiρσj
σi
N c¯Fj (t)] ≥ 1 and N c¯Fj (t) + kjρσiσj < 1. Then, substituting p∗(t)
into (A.74) and integrating from T to t gives
gL2 (t) = g
Ljb1
2 (t)
.
=g(t) +
γ2L(σj − kjρσi)2
4(AL + ηL)
[(ϕL(t))2 − 1] + (c¯− aj)γL(1− kjρσi
σj
)
[ ∫ t
T
ϕL(s)ds
+
γL
γj
∫ t
T
(ϕL(s))2
ϕFj (s)
ds
]− (c¯− aj)2 γL
γjσ2j
[ ∫ t
T
ϕL(s)
ϕFj (s)
ds+
γL
2γj
∫ t
T
(
ϕL(s)
ϕFj (s)
)2ds
]
. (A.77)
Equations (A.60) and (A.61) become
gFi2 (t) = g
Fib1
2 (t)
.
=g(t) +
γi(ϕ
Fi(t)− 1)
Ai + ηi
[
ki(c¯− aj)(−1 + kjρσi
σj
+
k1k2ργiσi
γjσj
− ρσiγi
γjσj
)− (θiai − kiθjaj)
]
+
γ2i σ
2
i [1 + (k1k2ρ)
2 − 2k1k2ρ2]
4(Ai + ηi)
[(ϕFi(t))2 − 1] + kiγi
γjσ2j
[1 +
kiγi
2γj
](c¯− aj)2(T − t), (A.78)
and
g
Fj
2 (t) = g
F˜jb1
2 (t)
.
=g(t) +
γj(ϕ
Fj (t)− 1)
Aj + ηj
[
(1− kjρσi
σj
)(c¯− aj)− (θjaj − kjθiai)
]
+
(kjγjσi)
2(1− ρ2)
4(Aj + ηj)
[(ϕFj (t))2 − 1]− 1
2(σj)2
(c¯− aj)2(T − t). (A.79)
• Subcase (Lb2) If aj + γjσ2jϕ
Fj (t)(1− kjρσiσj )MFj (t) ≤ cF , we have
p∗(t) = cF , q∗i (t, p
∗(t)) = 1, q∗j (t, p
∗(t)) = N cFj (t) +
kjρσi
σj
. (A.80)
The preconditions become K[N cFi(t) +
kiρσj
σi
N cFj (t)] ≥ 1 and N cFj (t) + kjρσiσj < 1. Then, substituting p∗(t)
into (A.74) and integrating from T to t gives
gL2 (t) = g
Ljb2
2 (t)
.
=g(t) +
γ2L(σj − kjρσi)2
4(AL + ηL)
[(ϕL(t))2 − 1] + (cF − aj)γL(1− kjρσi
σj
)
[ ∫ t
T
ϕL(s)ds
+
γL
γj
∫ t
T
(ϕL(s))2
ϕFj (s)
ds
]− (cF − aj)2 γL
γjσ2j
[ ∫ t
T
ϕL(s)
ϕFj (s)
ds+
γL
2γj
∫ t
T
(
ϕL(s)
ϕFj (s)
)2ds
]
. (A.81)
Equations (A.60) and (A.61) become
gFi2 (t) = g
Fib2
2 (t)
.
=g(t) +
γi(ϕ
Fi(t)− 1)
Ai + ηi
[
ki(cF − aj)(−1 + kjρσi
σj
+
k1k2ργiσi
γjσj
− ρσiγi
γjσj
)− (θiai − kiθjaj)
]
+
γ2i σ
2
i [1 + (k1k2ρ)
2 − 2k1k2ρ2]
4(Ai + ηi)
[(ϕFi(t))2 − 1] + kiγi
γjσ2j
[1 +
kiγi
2γj
](cF − aj)2(T − t),
(A.82)
and
g
Fj
2 (t) = g
F˜jb2
2 (t)
.
=g(t) +
γj(ϕ
Fj (t)− 1)
Aj + ηj
[
(1− kjρσi
σj
)(cF − aj)− (θjaj − kjθiai)
]
+
(kjγjσi)
2(1− ρ2)
4(Aj + ηj)
[(ϕFj (t))2 − 1]− 1
2(σj)2
(cF − aj)2(T − t). (A.83)
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• Subcase (Lb3) If cF < aj + γjσ2jϕ
Fj (t)(1− kjρσiσj )MFj (t) < c¯, we have
p∗(t) = aj + γjσ2jϕ
Fj (t)(1− kjρσi
σj
)MFj (t),
q∗i (t, p
∗(t)) = 1, q∗j (t, p
∗(t)) = (1− kjρσi
σj
)MFj (t) +
kjρσi
σj
. (A.84)
The preconditions become K[NaFi(t) + KF˜iMFj (t)] ≥ 1 and (1 − kjρσiσj )MFj (t) +
kjρσi
σj
< 1. Substituting
p∗(t) into (A.74) and integrating from T to t gives
gL2 (t) = g
Ljb3
2 (t)
.
=g(t) +
γ2L(σj − kjρσi)2
4(AL + ηL)
[(ϕL(t))2 − 1]
+
1
2
γL(σj − kjρσi)2
∫ t
T
ϕL(s)(γjϕ
Fj (s) + γLϕ
L(s))MFj (s)ds. (A.85)
Equations (A.60) and (A.61) become
gFi2 (t) = g
Fib3
2 (t)
.
= g(t)− γi(θiai − kiθjaj)
Ai + ηi
[ϕFi(t)− 1] + γ
2
i σ
2
i [1 + (k1k2ρ)
2 − 2k1k2ρ2]
4(Ai + ηi)
[(ϕFi(t))2 − 1]
− kiγi(σj − kjρσi)[−γjσj + kjργjσi + k1k2ργiσi − ρσiγi]
∫ t
T
ϕFi(s)ϕFj (s)MFj (s)ds
− 1
2
kiγi(2γj + kiγi)(σj − kjρσi)2
∫ t
T
(ϕFj (s)MFj (s))2ds, (A.86)
and
g
Fj
2 (t) = g
F˜jb3
2 (t)
.
=g(t)− γj(θjaj − kjθiai)
Aj + ηj
[ϕFj (t)− 1] + (kjγjσi)
2(1− ρ2)
4(Aj + ηj)
[(ϕFj (t))2 − 1]
− [γj(σj − kjρσi)]2
∫ t
T
(ϕFj (s))2MFj (s)
[3γjϕ
Fj (s) + γLϕ
L(s)]
2[2γjϕFj (s) + γLϕL(s)]
ds. (A.87)
• Case (Lc) If q˜i(t, p(t)) < 1, i = 1, 2, we have q∗i (t, p(t)) = q˜i(t, p(t)). Substituting q∗i (t, p(t)) into (A.69) and
simplifying gives
0 = sup
p(·)∈[cF ,c¯]
{dgL2 (t)
dt
+ β(2β + 1)σ2gL1 (t) +
1
2
(γLϕ
L(t))2[(σ1)
2 + (σ2)
2 + 2σ1σ2ρ]
+KγL
[− ϕL(t)DF1(t)
γ1ϕF1(t)
(p(t)− a1)− ϕ
L(t)DF2(t)
γ2ϕF2(t)
(p(t)− a2) + ϕ
L(t)DF˜1(t)
γ1σ21ϕ
F1(t)
(p(t)− a1)2
+
ϕL(t)DF˜2(t)
γ2σ22ϕ
F2(t)
(p(t)− a2)2 + ρϕ
L(t)DF12(t)
γ1γ2σ1σ2ϕF1(t)ϕF2(t)
(p(t)− a1)(p(t)− a2)
]}
, (A.88)
where
DFi(t) =
1
K
γiϕ
Fi(t) + γLϕ
L(t)[1 + kjρ
2 +
σjρ
σi
(1 + kj)], i 6= j ∈ {1, 2},
DF˜i(t) =1 +
K(1 + (kjρ)
2 + 2kjρ
2)γLϕ
L(t)
2γiϕFi(t)
, i 6= j ∈ {1, 2},
DF12(t) =k1γ1ϕ
F1(t) + k2γ2ϕ
F2(t) +K(1 + k1 + k2 + k1k2ρ
2)γLϕ
L(t). (A.89)
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The first-order condition about p(t) for maximizing the value in equation (A.88) gives that
p∗(t) =
PN (t)
PD(t)
∨ cF ∧ c¯, (A.90)
where
PN (t) =(σ1σ2)
2[γ2ϕ
F2(t)DF1(t) + γ1ϕ
F1(t)DF2(t)] + 2a1σ
2
2γ2ϕ
F2(t)DF˜1(t)
+ 2a2σ
2
1γ1ϕ
F1(t)DF˜2(t) + (a1 + a2)ρσ1σ2D
F12(t), (A.91)
PD(t) =2σ22γ2ϕ
F2(t)DF˜1(t) + 2σ21γ1ϕ
F1(t)DF˜2(t) + 2ρσ1σ2D
F12(t). (A.92)
• Subcase (Lc1) If P
N (t)
PD(t)
≥ c¯, then
p∗(t) = c¯, q∗i (t, p
∗(t)) = K[N c¯Fi(t) +
kiρσj
σi
N c¯Fj (t)]. (A.93)
The precondition becomes K[N c¯Fi(t) +
kiρσj
σi
N c¯Fj (t)] < 1, i = 1, 2. Substituting p∗(t) into the equation
(A.88) and integrating from T to t gives
gL2 (t) = g
Lc1
2 (t)
.
=g(t) +
γ2L[(σ1)
2 + (σ2)
2 + 2σ1σ2ρ]
4(AL + ηL)
[(ϕL(t))2 − 1] +KγL
{ (c¯− a1)
γ1
∫ t
T
ϕL(s)DF1(s)
ϕF1(s)
ds
+
(c¯− a2)
γ2
∫ t
T
ϕL(s)DF2(s)
ϕF2(s)
ds− (c¯− a1)
2
γ1σ21
∫ t
T
ϕL(s)DF˜1(s)
ϕF1(s)
ds
− (c¯− a2)
2
γ2σ22
∫ t
T
ϕL(s)DF˜2(s)
ϕF2(s)
ds− ρ(c¯− a1)(c¯− a2)
γ1γ2σ1σ2
∫ t
T
ϕL(s)DF12(s)
ϕF1(s)ϕF2(s)
ds
}
. (A.94)
Equation (A.62) becomes
gFi2 (t) = g
Fic1
2 (t)
.
=g(t) +
γi
Ai + ηi
[c¯− ai − ki(c¯− aj)− θiai + kiθjaj ][ϕFi(t)− 1]
+
K2(T − t)
2
{− [1− (k1k2ρ)2]
(σi)2
(c¯− ai)2 + kiγi[2γj − 2k1k2γjρ
2 + kiγi(1− ρ2)]
(γjσj)2
(c¯− aj)2
+
2kiρ[−γi(1− k1k2) + kjγj(1− k1k2ρ2)]
σiσjγj
(c¯− ai)(c¯− aj)
}
. (A.95)
• Subcase (Lc2) If P
N (t)
PD(t)
≤ cF , then
p∗(t) = cF , q∗i (t, p
∗(t)) = K[N cFi(t) +
kiρσj
σi
N cFj (t)]. (A.96)
The precondition becomes K[N cFi(t)+
kiρσj
σi
N cFj (t)] < 1, i = 1, 2. Substituting p∗(t) into the equation(A.88)
and integrating from T to t gives
gL2 (t) = g
Lc2
2 (t)
.
=g(t) +
γ2L[(σ1)
2 + (σ2)
2 + 2σ1σ2ρ]
4(AL + ηL)
[(ϕL(t))2 − 1] +KγL
{ (cF − a1)
γ1
∫ t
T
ϕL(s)DF1(s)
ϕF1(s)
ds
+
(cF − a2)
γ2
∫ t
T
ϕL(s)DF2(s)
ϕF2(s)
ds− (cF − a1)
2
γ1σ21
∫ t
T
ϕL(s)DF˜1(s)
ϕF1(s)
ds
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− (cF − a2)
2
γ2σ22
∫ t
T
ϕL(s)DF˜2(s)
ϕF2(s)
ds− ρ(cF − a1)(cF − a2)
γ1γ2σ1σ2
∫ t
T
ϕL(s)DF12(s)
ϕF1(s)ϕF2(s)
ds
}
. (A.97)
Equation (A.62) becomes
gFi2 (t) = g
Fic2
2 (t)
.
= g(t) +
γi
Ai + ηi
[cF − ai − ki(cF − aj)− θiai + kiθjaj ][ϕFi(t)− 1]
+
K2(T − t)
2
{− [1− (k1k2ρ)2]
(σi)2
(cF − ai)2 + kiγi[2γj − 2k1k2γjρ
2 + kiγi(1− ρ2)]
(γjσj)2
(cF − aj)2
+
2kiρ[−γi(1− k1k2) + kjγj(1− k1k2ρ2)]
σiσjγj
(cF − ai)(cF − aj)
}
. (A.98)
• Subcase (Lc3) If cF <
PN (t)
PD(t)
< c¯, then
p∗(t) =
PN (t)
PD(t)
, q∗i (t, p
∗(t)) = K
[ PN (t)
PD(t)
− ai
γiσ2i ϕ
Fi(t)
+
kiρ(
PN (t)
PD(t)
− aj)
γjσjσiϕFj (t)
]
. (A.99)
The precondition becomes K[
PN (t)
PD(t)
−ai
γiσ2iϕ
Fi (t)
+
kiρ(
PN (t)
PD(t)
−aj)
γjσjσiϕ
Fj (t)
] < 1, i = 1, 2. Substituting p∗(t) into the equa-
tion(A.88) and integrating from T to t gives
gL2 (t) = g
Lc3
2 (t)
.
= g(t) +
γ2L[(σ1)
2 + (σ2)
2 + 2σ1σ2ρ]
4(AL + ηL)
[(ϕL(t))2 − 1] +KγL
{∫ t
T
ϕL(s)DF1(s)
γ1ϕF1(s)
(
PN (s)
PD(s)
− a1)ds
+
∫ t
T
ϕL(s)DF2(s)
γ2ϕF2(s)
(
PN (s)
PD(s)
− a2)ds−
∫ t
T
ϕL(s)DF˜1(s)
γ1σ21ϕ
F1(s)
(
PN (s)
PD(s)
− a1)2ds
−
∫ t
T
ϕL(s)DF˜2(s)
γ2σ22ϕ
F2(s)
(
PN (s)
PD(s)
− a2)2ds−
∫ t
T
ρϕL(s)DF12(s)
γ1γ2σ1σ2ϕF1(s)ϕF2(s)
(
PN (s)
PD(s)
− a1)(P
N (s)
PD(s)
− a2)ds
}
. (A.100)
Equation (A.62) becomes
gFi2 (t) = g
Fic3
2 (t)
.
= g(t)− γi(θiai − kiθjaj)
Ai + ηi
[ϕFi(t)− 1]− γi
∫ t
T
ϕFi(s)(
PN (s)
PD(s)
− ai)ds+ kiγi
∫ t
T
ϕFi(s)(
PN (s)
PD(s)
− aj)ds
+
K2
2
{1− (k1k2ρ)2
(σi)2
∫ t
T
(
PN (s)
PD(s)
− ai)2ds− kiγi[2γj − 2k1k2γjρ
2 + kiγi(1− ρ2)]
(γjσj)2
∫ t
T
(
PN (s)
PD(s)
− aj)2ds
− 2kiρ[−γi(1− k1k2) + kjγj(1− k1k2ρ
2)]
σiσjγj
]
∫ t
T
(
PN (s)
PD(s)
− ai)(P
N (s)
PD(s)
− aj)ds
}
. (A.101)
Summing up the above processes, we can get Theorem 1.
Appendix B Proof of Corollary 2
Proof: The conclusions in Table 2 can be obtained by taking partial derivatives of b∗L(t) and b
∗
i (t) with corresponding
variables, respectively. From AL = r0 −BL − CL, CL = ηLe−αLhL , BLe−αLhL = (αL +AL + ηL)CL, we can get that
AL =
1
1 + ηL
[r0 − (αL + ηL)ηL − ηLe−αLhL ].
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Put AL into the equation (3.23), and take the derivative with respect to ηL and αL respectively. We can get that
∂b∗L(t)
∂ηL
= b∗L(t)(T − t)
1
(1 + ηL)2
[r0 + αL + e
−αLhL − 1], ∂b
∗
L(t)
∂αL
= b∗L(t)(T − t)
ηL
1 + ηL
[1− hLe−αLhL ].
b∗L(t) > 0 because of β ≥ 0. Thus, the left side of equation (3.32) and equation (3.33) is established. Following similar
derivations, we can get that the right side of equation (3.32) and equation (3.33) is true.
Appendix C Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: According to (2.6) and (2.18), we apply Itoˆ’s formula
d(V Fi(t))2 = 2V Fi(t)
{AFiV Fi(t, xˆi, yi, yj , s)|(q∗1 (·),b∗1(·),q∗2 (·),b∗2(·))dt+ V Fixˆi [q∗i (t)σidWi(t)− kiq∗j (t)σjdWj(t)]
+ [V Fixˆi (b
∗
i (t)− kib∗j (t)) + sV Fis ]σsβdW (t)
}
+
{
(V Fixˆi )
2
[
(q∗i (t)σi)
2 + (kiq
∗
j (t)σj)
2 + (b∗i (t)− kib∗j (t))2σ2s2β
− 2q∗i (t)σikiq∗j (t)σjρ
]
+ σ2s2β+2(V Fis )
2 + 2V Fixˆi V
Fi
s (b
∗
i (t)− kib∗j (t))σ2s2β+1
}
dt.
From Section 3.1, we know that AFiV Fi(t, xˆi, yi, yj , s)|(q∗1 (·),b∗1(·),q∗2 (·),b∗2(·)) = 0. By plugging the expressions of V Fixˆi , V Fis ,
b∗1(·) and b∗2(·) into the above equation, we obtain
d(V Fi(t))2
(V Fi(t))2
= −2{γiϕFi(t)[q∗i (t)σidWi(t)− kiq∗j (t)σjdWj(t)] +
r − r0
σsβ
dW (t)}
+ {(γiϕFi(t))2[(q∗i (t)σi)2 + (kiq∗j (t)σj)2 − 2q∗i (t)σikiq∗j (t)σjρ] + (
r − r0
σsβ
)2}dt
= ΘFi1 (t)dt+ Θ
Fi
2 (t)dWi(t) + Θ
Fi
3 (t)dWj(t)− 2
r − r0
σsβ
dW (t), (C.102)
where ΘFi1 (t) = (γiϕ
Fi(t))2[(q∗i (t)σi)
2+(kiq
∗
j (t)σj)
2−2q∗i (t)σikiq∗j (t)σjρ]+( r−r0σsβ )2, ΘFi2 (t) = −2γiϕFi(t)q∗i (t)σi, ΘFi3 (t) =
2γiϕ
Fi(t)kiq
∗
j (t)σj . The forms of q
∗
i (t) and q
∗
j (t) in different cases are given by Theorem 1. Thus, the solution to the
equation (C.102) is
(V Fi(t))2
(V Fi(0))2
= exp
{∫ t
0
ΘFi1 (ι)dι
}
+ exp
{∫ t
0
[−1
2
ΘFi2 (ι)
2 − 1
2
ΘFi3 (ι)
2]dι+
∫ t
0
ΘFi2 (ι)dWi(ι) +
∫ t
0
ΘFi3 (ι)dWj(ι)
}
+ exp
{− 1
2
∫ t
0
4(r − r0)2
σ2
(S(ι))−2βdι−
∫ t
0
2(r − r0)
σ
(S(ι))−βdW (ι)
}
. (C.103)
By virtue of Novikov’s condition, we know that exp
{− 12 ∫ t0 ΘFi2 (ι)2dι+ ∫ t0 ΘFi2 (ι)dWi(ι)} and exp{− 12 ∫ t0 ΘFi3 (ι)2dι+∫ t
0
ΘFi3 (ι)dWj(ι)
}
are two martingales. In addition, according to (2.6) and Itoˆ’s formula, we can drive
d(S(t))−2β = [β(2β + 1)σ2 − 2βr(S(t))−2β ]dt− 2βσ(S(t))−βdW (t). (C.104)
By using Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 5.1 of Zeng and Taksar (2013), we can verify that exp
{− 12 ∫ t0 4(r−r0)2σ2 (S(ι))−2βdι−∫ t
0
2(r−r0)
σ (S(ι))
−βdW (ι) is a martingale. From the range of parameters and the form of ϕFi(t), we know that ΘFi1 (t) <∞.
Thus taking expectation from both sides of equation (C.103), we obtain
E[(V Fi(t))2] = (V Fi(0))2 exp
{∫ t
0
ΘFi1 (ι)dι
}
< +∞.
Therefore, for n = 1, 2, · · · , we have
Et,xˆi,yi,yj ,s
{
[V Fi(τn ∧ T, Xˆi(τn ∧ T ), Yi(τn ∧ T ), Yj(τn ∧ T ), S(τn ∧ T ))]2
}
< +∞.
Then, the proof is complete.
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Appendix D Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: Obviously, the pair (p∗(t), b∗L(t), q
∗
1(t), b
∗
1(t), q
∗
2(t), b
∗
2(t)) obtained in Theorem 1 is an admissible strategy, i.e.,
(p∗(t), b∗L(t), q
∗
1(t), b
∗
1(t), q
∗
2(t), b
∗
2(t)) ∈ ΠL ×Π1 ×Π2. Next, we show the optimality of (p∗(t), b∗L(t), q∗1(t), b∗1(t),
q∗2(t), b
∗
2(t)) in ΠL × Π1 × Π2. From the construction of τn, we know that τn ∧ T → T when n → +∞. For
∀(p∗(t), b∗L(t), q∗1(t), b∗1(t), q∗2(t), b∗2(t)) ∈ ΠL × Π1 × Π2 and ∀ι ∈ [t, T ], we apply Itoˆ’s formula to V Fi(t, xˆi, yi, yj , s)
and deduce
V Fi(τn ∧ T, Xˆi(τn ∧ T ), Yi(τn ∧ T ), Yj(τn ∧ T ), S(τn ∧ T ))
= V Fi(t, xˆi, yi, yj , s) +
∫ τn∧T
t
AFiV Fi(ι, Xˆi(ι), Yi(ι), Yj(ι), S(ι))dι+
∫ τn∧T
t
V Fixˆi (ι, Xˆi(ι), Yi(ι), Yj(ι), S(ι))qi(ι)σidWi(ι)
−
∫ τn∧T
t
V Fixˆi (ι, Xˆi(ι), Yi(ι), Yj(ι), S(ι))kiqj(ι)σjdWj(ι) +
∫ τn∧T
t
V Fixˆi (ι, Xˆi(ι), Yi(ι), Yj(ι), S(ι))(bi(ι)
− kibj(ι))σ(S(ι))βdW (ι) +
∫ τn∧T
t
V Fis (ι, Xˆi(ι), Yi(ι), Yj(ι), S(ι))σ(S(ι))
β+1dW (ι).
Because the last four terms are square-integrable martingales with zero expectations, taking expectation on both sides
of the above equation conditional on Xˆi(t) = xˆi, Yi(t) = yi, Yj(t) = yj and S(t) = s, we have
Et,xˆi,yi,yj ,s[V
Fi(τn ∧ T, Xˆi(τn ∧ T ), Yi(τn ∧ T ), Yj(τn ∧ T ), S(τn ∧ T ))]
= V Fi(t, xˆi, yi, yj , s) + Et,xˆi,yi,yj ,s
[ ∫ τn∧T
t
AFiV Fi(ι, Xˆi(ι), Yi(ι), Yj(ι), S(ι))dι
] ≤ V Fi(t, xˆi, yi, yj , s).
In terms of Lemma 1, the uniform integrability of V Fi(τn ∧ T, Xˆi(τn ∧ T ), Yi(τn ∧ T ), Yj(τn ∧ T ), S(τn ∧ T )) yields
sup
(qi(·),bi(·))∈Πi
Et,xˆi,yi,yj ,s
[
Ui
(
Xˆpiii (T ) + ηiYi(T )− kiηjYj(T )
)]
= lim
n→+∞Et,xˆi,yi,yj ,s
[
V Fi(τn ∧ T, Xˆi(τn ∧ T ), Yi(τn ∧ T ), Yj(τn ∧ T ), S(τn ∧ T ))
] ≤ V Fi(t, xˆi, yi, yj , s).
When (qi(·), bi(·)) = (q∗i (·), b∗i (·)), the inequality in the above formula becomes an equality, and thus
sup
(qi(·),bi(·))∈Πi
Et,xˆi,yi,yj ,s
[
Ui
(
Xˆpiii (T ) + ηiYi(T )− kiηjYj(T )
)]
= V Fi(t, xˆi, yi, yj , s).
Following similar derivations, we can obtain
sup
(p(·),bL(·))∈ΠL
Et,xL,yL,s [UL(X
piL
L (T ) + ηLYL(T ))] ≤ V L(t, xL, yL, s).
And when (p(·), bL(·)) = (p∗(·), b∗L(·)), the above inequality becomes an equality. Then, the proof is complete.
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